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The lead article for this issue is Professor Charles Weisselberg’s annualreview of the criminal-law opinions issued by the United States SupremeCourt during its past Term.  Since Professor Weisselberg took over this
survey after the death of our long-time contributor, Professor Charles
Whitebread, the survey has changed somewhat in its format.  We have greatly
appreciated Professor Weisselberg’s addition of an overview not only of the
Court’s opinions from the prior Term but also his note of key issues pending
during its current Term as well.  In addition, in key areas, he has provided us
with a review of the initial struggle faced by lower courts in applying a new
decision.  This year, he has done that for us with respect to the Court’s new
ruling on the exclusionary rule, Herring v. United States.  That review of new
cases during the first 10 months after the Herring decision was issued helps
all of us to better gauge the impact of the ruling—a key goal of this annual
review, which helps all of us to stay abreast of
changes in the law and to begin to assess the
significance of the changes.
I want to thank Professor Weisselberg for
another great contribution in this year’s arti-
cle, and I also want to note one item that was
out of his control—the timing of its publica-
tion.  He turned in his review in a timely man-
ner, but we had other factors that led to delays
in this issue.  Professor Weisselberg even
updated the article significantly once after
submission to reflect some of the early opin-
ions from the present Term.  Since the issue is
now going to press during the rush to publish
opinions near the end of the present Term, the article will necessarily omit ref-
erence to those more recent opinions.  Please accept our apology for the delay,
and realize that it was not Professor Weisselberg’s fault.  We will work to make
sure that the review of the 2009–2010 Term gets to you much more quickly.
Even with this year’s timing, however, you will find his article of great help in
keeping up to date and in assessing the importance of these cases.
Our second article will develop themes familiar to every judge related to
stress and safety in the courtroom.  The article reviews the research of several
lawyers and social scientists regarding stress felt by judges and jurors.  As
always, we invite the responsive comments of our readers, either in the form
of an essay or a letter to the editor.  Our third article is an adaption by
Professor Jennifer Robbennolt of a more extensive article she published in
2008 in the Harvard Negotiation Law Review.  Professor Robbennolt agreed to
update her article and to adapt it for a judicial audience because she believed
that giving judges a better understanding of the effects that apologies may
have on the decision making of both parties and their attorneys could help us
to more effectively help parties resolve their disputes.  We agree, and we think
you’ll find her article of great interest.—SL 
Court Review, the quarterly journal of the American
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we hope to provide information that will be of use to
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Some 27 years ago when I was first elected to the criminal
bench in New Orleans, I was approached at my swearing in by
a very distinguished, long-serving judge.  He said to me, “Son,
the first thing you have to do is become a member of the
American Judges Association.  It will be like having a friend on
the bench because when you sit you need all the help you can
get.” That distinguished judge was the late Oliver Delery, who
was then a member of the American Judges Association and
later became its president.
I learned two things from that encounter.
First, unfortunately, he was right—a presiding
judge on his or her bench has very few friends.
Second, and fortunately, he was also right that the
American Judges Association became one of
those few friends.
Being sworn in as the 48th president of the
American Judges Association last fall was cer-
tainly the crowning event of my judicial career.  It is more spe-
cial as this is our 50th anniversary, our golden year.  I appreci-
ate the trust and confidence that my colleagues from all over
this North American continent have bestowed upon me by
electing me president, and can honestly confess that I felt both
excitement and trepidation at the tasks ahead.   
The American people seem to have a love-hate relationship
with their judicial system, and maybe that’s the way it should
be.  However, when the judiciary faces this issue, we must face
it and answer it with one voice.  We consider ourselves, the
American Judges Association, that voice.  We are the “voice of
the judiciary.”® This mantle was not self-bestowed, but was
earned after laboring in the judicial field for more 50 years.  In
1959 we started our organization with a handful of judges and
have grown to almost 2,500 today.
My pledge to this association is to strive to make sure that
we continue to be the voice of the judiciary in all corners of
America.  Attacks on the judiciary are common in this day and
age.  We will attempt to be at the forefront of these attacks with
in-depth studies and hopefully in-depth answers.
This year is going to be especially challenging due to the
downturn in our economy.  The court systems of many states
in this nation and many provinces in Canada will be faced with
funding crises.  This will impact membership and participation
for our organization and similar ones as well. We
will have to consider a way to economize but still
maintain the level of service that our association
has grown accustomed to in the past.  I know
that the current board of governors and the exec-
utive committee team that I have chosen are up
to the task.
As the expression goes, “No rest for the
weary.” On the first Tuesday after I took office,
my first official duty as the new AJA president was to attend the
meeting of the Canadian Association of Provincial Court
Judges in Calgary.  I addressed the Canadian judges on prob-
lems facing the American Judges Association.  I also had the
opportunity to spend a great deal of time with their new presi-
dent, Judge Gerald Meagher. Judge Meagher and I agreed to
maintain close contact with each other to discuss similar prob-
lems facing both of our judicial organizations.
I urge all fellow AJA members to continue to faithfully read
Court Review, our official AJA publication, as well as
Benchmark, our newsletter, which is now produced in an elec-
tronic format in order to save costs.   I look forward to all future
publications of this journal to report to you the latest issues
impacting our organization as well as my activities during the
year.
God Bless.
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Thane Rosenbaum, LAW LIT FROM ATTICUS FINCH TO THE
PRACTICE:  A COLLECTION OF GREAT WRITING ABOUT THE LAW,
The New Press, 2007.  296 pp.  $17.95.
For those individuals whose bookshelves are lined withmore than the stately rows of law treatises, Law Lit: FromAtticus Finch to The Practice will function as a series of
delicious appetizers that leave you satisfied yet yearning for the
main entree.  If literature is your forte, you will indubitably
add a few more books to your reading list after perusing this
anthology.  If literature isn’t your normal cup of tea, this
anthology—brimming with iconic classics—is still immensely
practical and delightful to lawyers and judges who regularly
teach or speak publicly about the law and are interested in
delving into the depths of what editor Thane Rosenbaum calls
“the human spirit that is antiseptically left out of the legal sys-
tem.”
Rosenbaum suggests in his introduction that society is both
intensely drawn to and repulsed by the law and that “the artist
enters [at] the intersection between longing for law and the
consequences.”  His anthology extrapolates upon this theme
from the soaring rhetoric and righteous condemnations in
Émile Zola’s J’Accuse, a famous editorial condemning the
French government of anti-Semitism in the Dreyfus Affair, to
the dramatic declaration that “You can’t handle the truth!” dur-
ing the intense cross-examination scene in A Few Good Men.
Rosenbaum has collected an outpouring of artistic creations
that address the tense interplay between popular beliefs about
law in its ability to transcend even the highest expectations of
morality and mercy and the fetid stink of the law as a corrupt,
repugnant monstrosity.  
This tense interplay between society’s adoration for and
contempt of the judicial system is truly the crux of this anthol-
ogy and where its use to teachers and public speakers becomes
most evident, although literature-oriented individuals won’t
lack reasons to pick up this anthology as a fascinating literary
insight into the public perception of the legal system.  In
Rosenbaum’s experience as a teacher of the law and literature
for more than 15 years, he has amassed quite the selection of
writings that appeal across the spectrum of the legal experi-
ences.  He divides these writings into thematic parts (clearly
enjoying their clever alliterative titles) that encompass:  the
Law Elevated, Lawless Law, the Law and Liberty, the Law Made
Low, the Law Laborious, the Lawyer as Lout, the Law and the
Loophole, Layman’s Law, and the Law and Longing.  
Rosenbaum garnishes these literary legal themes with dif-
ferent genres as he pulls excerpts from novels, short stories,
poems, speeches, songs, letters, editorials, memoirs, television,
films, plays, and even a judicial opinion.  Through these diver-
gent mediums, he views law literature as “universally fixated
on the theme of law as menace [but with]  the potential, in
some transcendent way, to humanize the legal system, as well.”
For example, teachers of the law can humanize the process of
the preliminary hearing with Alice Sebold’s memoir Lucky as
she endures the dehumanizing, grueling, and bewildering
cross-examination by the defense attorney about the events of
her rape as a college freshman.  As Law Lit elucidates through
snippets of literature, the cruel dehumanization of the individ-
ual trapped in a moribund or lethargic legal system actually
humanizes all the players of that legal system.  Through this
anthology’s humanizing effects, law ceases to be abstract and
becomes instead something powerfully real, concrete, and
vibrant.
And it is the vibrancy of literature that can open the flood-
gates of discussion and help make connections between
abstract legal ideas and the practical realities that result from
them.  Liberty—an altogether abstract concept—becomes tan-
gible while reading Martin Luther King Jr.’s “Letter from a
Birmingham Jail” or Johnny Cash’s song “Folsom Prison
Blues.”  Infinitely quotable, these selected works appeal to
emotive and intellectual responses in people because they
address truths in the experiences of life.  And even when read-
ing the trial scene from Lewis Carroll’s allegorical Alice’s
Adventures in Wonderland—ripe with the fantastic elements of
a crazed queen of hearts, a white rabbit, and a mad hatter—we
can see through the opaque veil of fantasy and identify justifi-
able critiques of the legal system.  A good teacher or public
speaker could readily make use of Carroll’s caricature of jurors
as a launching point for discussing a juror’s potential confusion
with courtroom procedures or even advocating policies for
jury reform.
One particular strength of this anthology lies in the abun-
dance of poignant and masterful selections that address issues
of gender, race, and socioeconomic class.  Law Lit provides a
meaningful array of literary experiences dealing with gender
and the law from the subjugation of women and the power of
memory and written language in Margaret Atwood’s A
Handmaid’s Tale to their infantilization and belittlement (and
yet superiority) in Susan Glaspell’s “A Jury of Her Peers.”
Likewise, Rosenbaum has included a solid collection of works
that deal with race with excerpts from African-American
authors like Langston Hughes, Richard Wright, and Paul
Laurence Dunbar.  For socioeconomic class, Bernard Malmud’s
character Bloostein as an impoverished immigrant is as earnest
and heartbreaking as he is enlightening; as any procedural jus-
tice aficionado would note, it is critical to a person’s sense of
justice to be treated with common courtesy and dignity—even
if and especially when you have none, no one, and nothing.
As impressive and delightful of an endeavor as this anthol-
ogy is, it has shortcomings.   Rosenbaum resorts to recycling
authors—sometimes even the same works—throughout the
anthology.  For example, he pulls three excerpts from E.L.
Lyric Law:
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Doctorow’s The Book of Daniel, a fictionalized account of the
Rosenberg’s trial for espionage during the Cold War, and he
cites Scott Turow’s work three times as well.  And while
Charles Dickens’ Bleak House may be replete with popular rep-
resentations of the law as a laborious and soulless entity, it’s
unnecessary to reuse this work too when the history of litera-
ture teems with such examples of popular sentiments.
In the opening line of his introduction, Rosenbaum
acknowledges this immense pool of possible material.  He
remarks that “[t]hroughout history and nearly all over the
world, there has been no greater and more paradoxical love-
hate relationship than the one between laymen and lawyers.”
If this querulous relationship does exist—and it definitely
does—then Rosenbaum’s reuse of works, however classic or
interesting, is a wasted opportunity to continue demonstrating
his point that “law frustrates and intoxicates every culture and
every age.”  Despite this claim, Rosenbaum’s anthology notably
lacks Asian and Hispanic authors and perspectives, among
others.  The collection also leans heavily toward American
authors who have written within the last 100 years or so.
While this may have been the ultimate goal for the collection,
the introduction heavily stresses the law genre as multicultural
and timeless; it would’ve been nice to read a few more works
that evoked the eternal and multicultural elements of this
genre rather than reading different excerpts of the same works.
Even with these nit-picky criticisms and the literature
enthusiast’s desire for full works, not redacted ones, Law Lit is
a collection of writings that is both immensely enjoyable and
satisfying as legal literature and incredibly practical for use in
teaching or speaking about the law.  This anthology’s allure
derives from the human spirit that lives intertwined with the
law amid the pages of this anthology—that spirit is sweet and
bitter, despondent and radiant, generous and manipulative.
Treat this anthology not as a collected work for one sitting but
as a fine sample of a chef’s specialty:  savor each selection as an
individual piece, slowly, with great discussion, and pauses for
reflection and digestion. 
Rachel Beth Cunning is the judicial assistant to Judge Steve Leben
on the Kansas Court of Appeals.  She has a B.A. in English from
the University of Kansas, where she has also taken postgraduate
English classes and is presently taking courses in Latin education.
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1. 129 S.Ct. 1710 (2009).
2. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
3. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
4. Gant, 129 S.Ct. at 1718.
5. Id. at 1723.
6. 541 U.S. 615 (2004).
7. As shown in a Lexis search conducted on October 18, 2009.
The U.S. Supreme Court’s October 2008 Term gave us anumber of very important criminal law and procedurecases.  The Court overruled long-standing precedents on
automobile searches and post-arraignment interrogation.  The
justices also addressed whether the use of a forensic chemist’s
report violates the Confrontation Clause.  These three deci-
sions affect routine police and courtroom practices; undoubt-
edly, there will be periods of adjustment for judges, lawyers,
and police.  The Term was also marked by other Fourth
Amendment holdings, including one that either transforms
the exclusionary rule or merely draws it closer to the rule’s
underlying purpose, depending on one’s point of view.  This
article reviews some of the most significant criminal-law-
related opinions of the Supreme Court’s 2008-2009 Term,
with an emphasis on the decisions that have the greatest
impact upon the states.  The article concludes with a brief pre-
view of the current Term.
FOURTH AMENDMENT
During the 2007-2008 Term, the Court issued only one
Fourth Amendment decision.  Last year, the justices made up
for lost time.  Some of the Court’s most far-reaching rulings
were on Fourth Amendment issues. 
Vehicle Searches
In Arizona v. Gant,1 the Supreme Court revisited the scope
of a vehicle search incident to an arrest.  There may have been
decisions by the Court last Term of broader importance, but
this ruling impacts the way officers do their job every day.
The respondent in Gant was arrested on an outstanding
warrant for driving on a suspended license.  Officers saw Gant
pull into his driveway.  They called to him after he got out of
his car, and Gant met the officers about 10-12 feet from the
vehicle.  He was handcuffed and eventually placed in the back
of a patrol car.  Afterwards, officers searched the car and found
a bag of cocaine in the pocket of a jacket on the back seat.
The trial court determined that the officers did not have prob-
able cause to search the car but that the narcotics were found
pursuant to a permissible search incident to an arrest.  The
Arizona Supreme Court reversed, saying that there was no jus-
tification for the search of the car after Gant was handcuffed
and secured.  The U.S. Supreme Court split 5-4, but agreed.
Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens noted the twin
rationales for a search incident to an arrest set forth in Chimel
v. California2—officer safety and preservation of contraband.
In New York v. Belton,3 the Court upheld the search of an auto-
mobile incident to an arrest where an officer had stopped a car,
smelled marijuana, and observed an envelope on the floor that
appeared to be associated with marijuana.  The occupants of
the car were not all handcuffed.  Applying Chimel, the Court
accepted the State’s argument that it was reasonable for the
officer to believe the arrestees could have accessed the vehicle
and its contents.  Nevertheless, as Justice Stevens wrote, Belton
has subsequently been “widely understood to allow a vehicle
search incident to the arrest of a recent occupant even if there
is no possibility the arrestee could gain access to the vehicle at
the time of the search.”4 The majority in Gant rejected this
broad reading of Belton, though they also went further than
Chimel in one respect—the justices determined that officers
could search a car if they believed that evidence relating to the
offense of arrest was inside.  Gant thus provides that “[p]olice
may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only
if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger
compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to
believe that the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of
arrest.”5 Justice Scalia concurred.  He would have held that a
vehicle search incident to arrest is reasonable only when the
object of the search is evidence of crime (as opposed to officer
safety) but voted with the majority so that there would be an
opinion commanding five votes.  The dissenting justices criti-
cized the majority for (in their view) overruling Belton and
Thornton v. United States.6 Justice Alito wrote the primary dis-
sent, arguing that the circumstances did not justify abandoning
the general understanding of Belton.
In the first six months after the April 2009 decision in
Gant, the decision was cited in over 250 reported cases.7 A
pattern has not yet emerged.  Courts are applying the Gant cri-
teria (officer safety and the belief that the vehicle may contain
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9. See, e.g., People v. Estrada, 2009 Ill. App. LEXIS 819 (Ill. App. Ct.
2009); State v. Henning, 209 P.3d 711 (Kan. 2009) (invalidating a
state statute post-Gant); State v. Keaton, 2009 Kan. App. Unpub.
LEXIS 761 (Kan. Ct. App. 2009); State v. Carter, 682 S.E.2d 416
(N.C. Ct. App. 2009); State v. McCormick, 2009 Wash. App. LEXIS
2240 (Wash. Ct.  App. 2009).
10. See, e.g., United States v. Kellam, 568 F.3d 125 (3d Cir. 2009);
United States v. Martinez-Cortes, 566 F.3d 767 (8th Cir. 2009);
United States v. Morillo, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94396 (E.D.N.Y.
2009); United States v. Gilbert, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS (W.D. Pa.
2009); United States v. Arriaza, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59299 (E.D.
Va. 2009); Meister v. State, 912 N.E.2d 412 (Ind. 2009); State v.
Canter, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 4076 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009).
11. 129 S.Ct. 781 (2009).
12. 129. S.Ct. 2633 (2009).
13. While the opinion gave other reasons for this conclusion, one
astute commentator (a former assistant to the solicitor general)
noted:  “Right off the bat, I’m suspicious of the school adminis-
trators here, because as a socially aware person who is knowl-
edgeable about the younger generation from watching the WB,
I’m fairly confident that no teenaged girl today owns a piece of
clothing anywhere near big enough to conceal such a large tablet.”
John P. Elwood, What Were They Thinking:  The Supreme Court in
Revue, October Term 2008, 12 GREEN BAG 2d 429, 440 (2009).
14. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
15. Safford, 129 S.Ct. at 2642.
16. Id. at 2643.
evidence of the crime of arrest) to uphold vehicle searches
incident to arrest8 as well as to invalidate them,9 depending on
the relevant facts.  Gant did not undermine the other bases for
warrantless searches of automobiles, and courts have thus
often considered whether evidence no longer admissible post-
Gant may nevertheless be admitted because of a different law-
ful basis for the search (though some appellate courts may not
be free to consider grounds to uphold a search not argued
below).10 One interesting question, which I address below
after discussing Herring v. United States (the exclusionary rule
case), is whether the good-faith exception to the exclusionary
rule saves evidence seized in violation of Gant but obtained in
reliance on Belton.
Another Fourth Amendment decision, Arizona v. Johnson,11
may also be of interest, though it is much less momentous
than Gant.  There, the justices addressed whether officers may
frisk a passenger in a car that is stopped for a traffic violation.
Arizona police stopped a vehicle for a traffic infraction.  The
car had three occupants.  Based on their observations and
their conversation with a back-seat passenger, Johnson, offi-
cers suspected that Johnson had a weapon.  He was asked to
get out of the car and was patted down, and a gun was found.
It has been clear for some time that once a vehicle has been
detained for a traffic violation, police may order the driver to
get out of the automobile and may frisk him if the officer rea-
sonably believes the driver is armed and dangerous.  The
Court had also previously determined that passengers may be
ordered out of the vehicle following a traffic stop.  In Johnson,
the justices unanimously held that a passenger as well as a dri-
ver may be frisked if the officer reasonably suspects that the
passenger is armed and dangerous. 
School Searches
One of the most closely followed cases of the Term was
Safford Unified School District #1 v. Redding,12 which dealt with
whether school officials violated the Fourth Amendment by
partially strip-searching a student for drugs.  School officials
had found a day planner in which there were several knives,
lighters, a cigarette, and several pills (four prescription-
strength ibuprofens and one over-the-counter pill for pain and
inflammation).  The planner belonged to a 13-year old middle
school student, Savana Redding.  Redding told the assistant
principal that the planner
was hers, but that she had
loaned it several days earlier
to another student.  She
denied that any of the items
in the planner belonged to
her.  School officials
searched Redding’s back-
pack, finding nothing.  The
assistant principal
instructed a female adminis-
trative assistant to take
Redding to the nurse’s office.
The assistant and the nurse told Redding to pull out her bra
and the elastic on her undergarments.  No pills were found.
Redding’s mother filed a civil-rights suit against the school
district and individuals.  The district court found no Fourth
Amendment violation.  The court of appeals reversed.
By a vote of 8-1, the Supreme Court ruled that school offi-
cials violated Redding’s Fourth Amendment rights by con-
ducting a strip-search.  The Court did not question the ability
of the school district to promulgate a rule banning all drugs,
no matter how benign, without advance permission.  School
officials had sufficient suspicion to search the student’s back-
pack and outer clothing.  But there was insufficient evidence
to support the much more intrusive additional search.13 The
opinion by Justice Souter acknowledges that, as previously
held in New Jersey v. T.L.O.,14 school officials do not need
probable cause to conduct a search.  The standard is reason-
able suspicion, but the search must be reasonably related to its
objectives and must not be excessively intrusive in light of the
age and gender of the student and the type of infraction under
investigation.  In this case, there was no indication of danger
to students from the power of the drugs or their quantity, nor
was there any reason to believe that Redding was carrying
pills in her underwear.  Thus, “the content of the suspicion
failed to match the degree of intrusion.”15 Further, there must
be support for a reasonable suspicion of danger to the stu-
dents or of resort to hiding evidence in underwear “before a
search can reasonably make a quantum leap from outer
clothes and backpacks to exposure of intimate parts.”16
Although the majority found a constitutional violation,
In the first six
months after the
April 2009 decision
in Gant, the 
decision was cited
in over 250
reported cases.  
A pattern has not
yet emerged.
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seven justices determined that
school officials were entitled
to qualified immunity, partic-
ularly in light of lower-court
rulings applying T.L.O.
Justices Stevens and Ginsburg
dissented from this part of the
majority opinion.  They
would have found the law suf-
ficiently clear to hold the
school officials liable.    Justice Thomas agreed with the major-
ity’s judgment on qualified immunity but dissented from the
Fourth Amendment holding.  He would have found no consti-
tutional violation and would have ruled instead that judges
should not second-guess the measures taken by school officials
to maintain discipline and to ensure the health and safety of
the students in their charge.
The Exclusionary Rule
While Gant and Redding affect day-to-day policing, their
impact appears limited to certain types of searches.  Another
of the Court’s decisions, Herring v. United States,17 may have a
much wider influence.
In Herring, a warrant clerk called the sheriff ’s office in a
neighboring county to determine if the defendant (who was
retrieving items from an impounded truck) had an outstand-
ing warrant.  The neighboring county’s computer database
erroneously indicated that there was an outstanding arrest
warrant for failure to appear on a felony charge.  Relying upon
this information, an officer arrested the defendant and found
drugs and a weapon in his possession.  The question for the
Supreme Court was whether evidence is inadmissible under
the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule when an officer
conducts an unconstitutional search but acts on information
negligently maintained by law enforcement in a database.
By a 5-4 vote, the Court held that the evidence should not
be suppressed.  In his opinion for the majority, Chief Justice
Roberts pointed to United States v. Leon18 and other cases, and
he noted that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is deter-
rence.  He wrote that “[t]o trigger the exclusionary rule,
police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion
can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such
deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system.”19
Exclusion is not automatic.  When police errors “are the result
of negligence . . . rather than systemic error or reckless disre-
gard of constitutional requirements, any marginal deterrence
does not ‘pay its way.’”20 Justice Ginsburg wrote the primary
dissent, arguing that the exclusionary rule is not as narrowly
focused as presented by the majority (it has “a more majestic
conception”21) and that the rule is essential to command
respect for the Fourth Amendment.  She also pointed out that
the majority’s suggestion of only marginal deterrence when
the misconduct is merely careless runs counter to the premise
of tort law:  liability for negligence creates an incentive to act
with greater care.  Exclusion here would encourage those who
maintain databases to act more carefully.22 Justice Breyer also
dissented to note that a previous case forgiving a recordkeep-
ing error (Arizona v. Evans23) addressed an error by a court
clerk, not a mistake by police. 
The case is significant in a number of respects and leaves
several questions unanswered.  First, by holding that exclu-
sion is not automatic and that the exclusionary rule only
applies when deterrence outweighs harm to the justice sys-
tem, Herring invites courts to consider whether exclusion is
justified in a broad range of circumstances in which it may be
claimed that officers acted without bad intent or recklessness,
or where there was not some other sort of systemic error.
While the Herring Court cited to Leon, Herring broadened the
good-faith exception beyond instances in which officers relied
in good faith on judges (as in Leon), court clerks or other non-
law-enforcement actors.  Second, though the majority wrote
that “[t]he pertinent analysis of deterrence and culpability is
objective” rather than subjective,24 one may expect substantial
litigation and uncertainty over these issues.  Third, if exclu-
sion is only “triggered” when there is a need for deterrence or
the other requisite elements are in place, is it the defendant’s
burden to prove that exclusion is required, or is it the State’s
burden of showing that it meets a good-faith exception to the
exclusionary rule?25
In the first ten months since Herring was announced, the
decision has been cited in many reported cases.  While there
are a number of rulings applying Herring and finding officers’
conduct sufficiently or insufficiently culpable as to require
exclusion,26 it is too early to discern trends.  It is also not yet
clear whether the tendency will be for courts to make the
deterrence and culpability determinations case-by-case on an
infinite variety of facts, or whether more categorical
approaches will emerge (such as in Hudson v. Michigan,27
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where the justices took “knock and announce” violations out
of the scope of the exclusionary rule).  Some judges have,
however, indicated that the burden is on the State to establish
that officers acted in good faith.28
Finally, Herring has had an interesting impact on the imple-
mentation of Gant.  A question that has already split the fed-
eral courts is whether evidence seized in violation of Gant
should nevertheless be admitted if officers reasonably relied
on Belton and its progeny, the law prior to Gant.  Citing
Herring, some courts have ruled that the evidence should not
be excluded because, under these circumstances, there would
not be a significant deterrent effect and the officers were not
sufficiently culpable.29 Other courts have held that the evi-
dence must be excluded because newly announced Supreme
Court decisions apply to cases then pending on direct appeal
under well-established principles of retroactivity.30 The
Supreme Court recently denied a petition for writ of certiorari
raising this issue.31
SIXTH AMENDMENT
Last Term saw very important rulings on the rights to
counsel, a jury trial, a speedy trial, the Sixth Amendment
exclusionary rule, and the Confrontation Clause.
Right to Counsel
In Montejo v. Louisiana,32 the Court overturned Michigan v.
Jackson,33 which forbade police from initiating questioning of
a defendant who requested counsel at an arraignment or other
similar judicial proceeding.  Jesse Montejo was arrested for
robbery and murder.  He was brought before a judge for a “72-
hour hearing,” a preliminary proceeding at which counsel is
customarily appointed.  A minute order showed that counsel
was appointed, but the order did not indicate whether the
defendant affirmatively asked for a lawyer or whether counsel
was simply appointed as a matter of routine (as is common in
a number of jurisdictions).  After the proceeding, police initi-
ated further questioning.  Montejo waived his Miranda rights
and, among other things, wrote an incriminating letter of apol-
ogy to the victim’s widow.  The letter was introduced at trial,
and Montejo was convicted and sentenced to death.  On
appeal, the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the decision,
finding no Jackson error because the record did not indicate
that the defendant actually requested a lawyer or otherwise
affirmatively invoked his Sixth Amendment right to counsel at
the “72-hour hearing.”
The U.S. Supreme Court took the case to decide whether
after the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel has attached,
a defendant must affirma-
tively ask for counsel or take
steps to “accept” a lawyer to
trigger Jackson’s protections.
Montejo argued that because
the appointment practices of
jurisdictions vary so much,
such a rule would be
unworkable.  After oral argu-
ment the justices called for supplemental briefing on whether
Jackson should be overruled.  By a vote of 5-4, the justices set
Jackson aside.
In an opinion written by Justice Scalia, the majority charac-
terized Jackson as importing the rule of Edwards v. Arizona34
into the Sixth Amendment, stating that the only way to make
sense of Jackson is as protection from police badgering.  But the
majority noted that a defendant who has had counsel
appointed has other protections against badgering.  A waiver of
the right to counsel must be voluntary, and a defendant who
does not want to speak to the police without a lawyer “need
only say as much when he is first approached and given the
Miranda warnings,”35 which will trigger the protections of
Edwards.  The majority thought that the additional protections
of Jackson were not worth the costs and that the principles of
stare decisis were insufficient to require Jackson to be retained.
The primary dissent was written by Justice Stevens.  The dis-
senters contended that the majority misrepresented Jackson’s
underlying rationale and the constitutional interests the deci-
sion sought to protect.  Jackson, the dissenters wrote, is not
about police badgering.  Rather, “it is a rule designed to safe-
guard a defendant’s right to rely on the assistance of counsel.”36
Montejo represents a significant change in interrogation law
and may well spur new police practices.  While Montejo does
not undermine the old rule in Massiah v. United States37—under-
cover officers or informants still cannot elicit information from
a defendant after the right to counsel has attached—there is no
longer a bright-line rule prohibiting known officers from initi-
ating an interrogation and seeking a waiver of the right to coun-
sel.  Massiah aside, the main legal issues for post-arraignment
interrogations will now be the same as for interrogations prior
to arraignment:  compliance with Miranda and voluntariness.38
Last Term, the Court also addressed the scope of the Sixth
Amendment exclusionary rule when there is a violation of the
right to counsel.  The defendant in Kansas v. Ventris39 was in
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the hoosegow, charged with
murder and aggravated
robbery.  Officers planted
an informant in his cell.
Following a conversation
with the informant, Ventris
made incriminating state-
ments, which the State
conceded were the product
of a violation of the right to
counsel (a Massiah viola-
tion).  These statements
were excluded from the
prosecution’s case-in-chief
but were admitted to
impeach Ventris’s testi-
mony at trial.  In a 7-2
decision, the Supreme Court ruled that the statement was
properly admitted for impeachment.  Writing for the majority,
Justice Scalia determined that the constitutional violation
occurred in the jail cell, and the informant spoke to the defen-
dant without counsel.  Comparing the Sixth Amendment
exclusionary rule with that of the Fourth Amendment (and
echoing the holding earlier in Herring), the majority stated
that exclusion is not automatic but instead depends upon a
balancing of relevant factors.  In this case, the Court wrote,
“the game of excluding tainted evidence for impeachment
purposes is not worth the candle.”40 The interests safe-
guarded by exclusion are outweighed by the need to prevent
perjury and assure the integrity of the trial.  Justices Stevens
and Ginsburg dissented.  They argued that while the constitu-
tional breach began during the questioning by the informant,
the use of that evidence at trial compounded the violation.  In
their view, “[t]he use of ill-gotten evidence during any phase
of criminal prosecution does damage to the adversarial
process—the fairness of which the Sixth Amendment was
designed to protect.”41
Confrontation
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts42 is the most recent
Confrontation Clause decision in the Crawford43 line of cases.
The defendant in Melendez-Diaz was charged with drug distri-
bution offenses.  Seized evidence was sent to a state laboratory.
At trial, the State introduced the seized evidence as well as
sworn “certificates of analysis” prepared by lab analysts.  The
certificates gave the weight of the substances and stated that
they contained cocaine.  In a 5-4 ruling, the Court held that the
introduction of the chemist’s notarized certificates violated the
Sixth Amendment where the analysts were not called at trial.
The majority opinion, written by Justice Scalia, placed the
analysts’ sworn certificates squarely within the “core class of
testimonial statements” covered by the Confrontation Clause
as described in Crawford.44 Crawford referred to materials
such as affidavits or similar pretrial statements that prosecu-
tors would reasonably expect to be used at a later trial,45 and
sworn “certificates” are plainly affidavits.  The remainder of
the lengthy majority opinion was devoted to rebutting reasons
for removing affidavits about forensic evidence from the hold-
ing in Crawford.  The Court rejected claimed differences
between testimony recounting historical events and affidavits
relating to “neutral, scientific testing.”  The majority saw this
as an argument for a return to the pre-Crawford practice of
permitting the admission of evidence bearing “particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness” notwithstanding the
Confrontation Clause.  The justices also challenged the claims
that the admission of forensic evidence through affidavits had
a long pedigree, that these affidavits were akin to business
records, and that requiring live testimony would unduly inter-
fere with the criminal justice system.  Finally, the majority was
not persuaded by the fact that defendants could subpoena the
chemists.  As the opinion states, “the Confrontation Clause
imposes a burden on the prosecution to present its witnesses,
not on the defendant to bring those adverse witnesses into
court.”46 The dissenting justices, led by Justice Kennedy, con-
tested virtually every aspect of the majority opinion.  The dis-
senters forcefully argued that requiring these forensic experts
to appear at trial would have negligible benefits, threaten to
disrupt forensic investigations across the country, and put
prosecutions at risk.
The decision in Melendez-Diaz will have a substantial
impact.  Although the majority opinion notes that a number
of states already require testimony by forensic experts, there
are many jurisdictions that employ practices akin to that of
Massachusetts.  The majority addressed one way to lessen the
impact of the decision.  The Court noted that a number of
jurisdictions have adopted procedures through which the
prosecution gives notice of its intent to use a forensic analyst’s
report, and the defendant is then required to object and
demand the presence of the analyst at trial.
Melendez-Diaz has thus far been cited to find
Confrontation Clause violations due to the introduction of a
physician’s report evaluating a molestation victim,47 a report
of blood-alcohol content,48 an autopsy report,49 a report with
results of DNA analysis,50 a ballistics certificate,51 and govern-
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ment certificates showing the lack of a contractor’s license52 or
a motor vehicle operator’s permit,53 though these errors have
sometimes been found to be harmless.
A sequel to Melendez-Diaz was on the docket for the
Court’s current Term.  The Court granted certiorari in Briscoe
v. Virginia to decide whether a prosecutor may introduce a cer-
tificate of a forensic laboratory analysis, without presenting
the testimony of the analyst who prepared the certificate, if
the state provides a statutory mechanism for the accused to
call the analyst at the State’s expense. The justices heard argu-
ment but then simply vacated the decision and remanded for
further consideration in light of Melendez-Diaz.54
Speedy Trial
Vermont v. Brillon55 presented the question of whether
delays on the part of court-appointed counsel could be attrib-
uted to the State and thus support a dismissal for violation of
the right to a speedy trial.  Michael Brillon faced trial for
felony domestic assault.  During the almost three years that
the case awaited trial, he was represented by six different
lawyers.  They were discharged for different reasons.  The first
lawyer was relieved after his motion to continue the trial was
denied and the defendant fired him.  One lawyer was threat-
ened by the defendant.  Others were relieved because of diffi-
culties with their contracts with the State.  But it was also
clear that much of the delay was due to the inability or unwill-
ingness of assigned counsel to move the case forward.  For
this reason, Vermont’s Supreme Court found that the delay
violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights.
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed.  In a 7-2 decision
authored by Justice Ginsburg, the Court ruled that appointed
counsel are not generally state actors for the purposes of a
speedy-trial claim.  Thus, most of the delay caused by the
lawyers must therefore be attributed to the defendant, rather
than to the State.  Claims of speedy-trial violations are
assessed under the balancing test of Barker v. Wingo,56 which
includes the length and reasons for the delay, the defendant’s
assertion of his rights, and prejudice.  With the lawyers’ delays
now attributed to Brillon and not the State, Brillon’s claim
failed.  The Court did note, however, that the general rule
attributing to the defendant delays caused by appointed coun-
sel is not absolute.  The State might be charged with delay if,
for example, there is a systemic breakdown in the public
defender system, though the record did not suggest such an
institutional problem in the case at bench.
Justices Breyer and Stevens dissented, pointing out (among
other things) substantial periods where it appeared that Brillon
had no counsel or where it was clear that assigned counsel
took no action at all and then withdrew; they also observed
that the state court had substantial authority to supervise the
appointment of public defenders.
Right to a Jury
Trial/Sentencing
Last Term also produced
Oregon v. Ice,57 yet another
in the Apprendi58 line of
cases.  Thomas Ice was con-
victed of six sexual offenses
following a jury trial.  At
sentencing, the judge made
a series of factual findings,
including that Ice’s conduct
caused different harms to
the victim, which then per-
mitted the court to impose
consecutive sentences.  The
issue was whether the Sixth
Amendment required a jury
determination of these facts.  A closely divided Supreme
Court found that judges may decide whether to impose con-
secutive sentences.
Writing for the five-justice majority, Justice Ginsburg
stressed that each offense involved its own discrete sentence
and that, historically, the jury played no part in assessing
whether sentences were consecutive as opposed to concur-
rent.  The Court also noted that the previous Apprendi cases
all involved sentencing for a discrete crime and not, as in Ice,
sentencing for multiple offenses different in character or com-
mitted at different points in time.  Historical practice and
respect for state sovereignty both counseled against applying
Apprendi to the imposition of sentences for separate crimes.
Justice Scalia authored the dissent.  He found no room to dis-
tinguish the earlier Apprendi cases since the facts found by the
judge were necessary to commit the defendant to a longer
prison term.  He argued that all of the considerations relied
upon by the majority were in fact rejected in the prior deci-
sions.  He concluded that the majority’s opinion “muddies the
waters, and gives cause to doubt whether Court is willing to
stand by Apprendi’s interpretation of the Sixth Amendment
jury-trial guarantee.”59
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
Last Term saw two decisions on the collateral estoppel
principles relevant to the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy
Clause.  In the more important of the two, Yeager v. United
States,60 the defendant was tried on a variety of offenses relat-
ing to his employment as an officer of Enron Broadband
Services, including fraud and insider trading.  The jury acquit-
ted Yeager of the fraud counts but hung on the insider-trading
counts.  After a mistrial was declared on the latter counts, the
government obtained a new indictment recharging him with
some—but not all—of the insider-trading counts on which
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tion violated the Double
Jeopardy Clause.  The lower
federal courts turned the claim
aside, but the Supreme Court
reversed.
Justice Stevens wrote the
opinion for the six-justice
majority.  The Court first
addressed the question whether
the government should be per-
mitted to retry Yeager on the
insider-trading counts simply because the jury had not
reached a verdict on them (and thus he could not twice be
placed in jeopardy).  The majority determined that that
approach would not sufficiently protect the interest in pre-
serving the finality of the jury’s judgment on the fraud counts,
including the jury’s alleged finding (as part of that judgment)
that Yeager did not possess insider information.  Thus, the
Court turned to Ashe v. Swenson61 and its holding that the
Double Jeopardy Clause precludes the government from relit-
igating an issue that was necessarily decided by an acquittal in
a prior trial.  The majority found that Ashe applied even
though the acquittal and the failure to reach a verdict
occurred during the same trial.  Although the jury hung on
the insider-trading counts, if the possession of insider infor-
mation was critical in all of the charges against Yeager, a jury
verdict that necessarily decided that issue in his favor would
protect him from prosecution for any charge for which that
was an essential element.  The Court remanded for the court
of appeals to determine what the jury necessarily determined
as part of its acquittal.62 Justice Scalia (joined by Justices
Thomas and Alito) dissented, criticizing Ashe as departing
from the original meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
They would have held that jeopardy is commenced and ter-
minated charge by charge, not issue by issue, and that having
never once been convicted of insider trading, Yeager could not
be placed twice in jeopardy on these charges.  Nor would
these justices extend Ashe to these circumstances.
The other case, Bobby v. Bies,63 addressed whether the
lower federal courts erred in preventing the state courts from
considering Bies’ mental capacity.  Bies was convicted and sen-
tenced to death.  On direct review, the Ohio Supreme Court
considered the balance of aggravating circumstances and mit-
igating factors and affirmed, but it observed that Bies’ mild to
borderline retardation was entitled to some weight.  The U.S.
Supreme Court later decided Atkins v. Virginia,64 which barred
the execution of mentally retarded offenders.  An Ohio court
then set a hearing on the question of Bies’ mental capacity.
The federal courts, however, intervened, determining that the
Ohio Supreme Court had definitively established Bies’ mental
retardation and that relitigation would violate the Double
Jeopardy Clause.  In a unanimous decision, the U.S. Supreme
Court reversed.  As Justice Ginsburg wrote for the Court, Bies
was not twice put in jeopardy of a death sentence.  Nor did the
opinion of the Ohio Supreme Court provide a basis for preclu-
sion under Ashe.  Bies’ appeal in the Ohio Supreme Court did
not involve a determination of an issue of ultimate fact in his
favor in the way contemplated in Ashe; determining his men-
tal capacity was not necessary to the Ohio court’s affirmation
of the sentence.  Moreover, mental retardation as a mitigator
and mental retardation for the purposes of Atkins present dis-
crete issues.
DUE PROCESS AND JURY SELECTION
While there are, of course, many constitutional dimensions
to the jury process, the decision last Term in Rivera v. Illinois65
made clear that some jury selection errors implicate only state
law.  The defendant in Rivera was on trial for murder.  His
lawyers sought to exercise a peremptory challenge.  The trial
judge disallowed it, raising a concern under Batson v.
Kentucky.66 The challenged juror eventually served as
foreperson.  The Illinois Supreme Court found that the trial
court should have allowed the peremptory challenge but that
the error was harmless.
The U.S. Supreme Court unanimously agreed.  In an opin-
ion by Justice Ginsburg, the Court noted that the
Constitution does not require states to provide peremptory
challenges.  These challenges can be withheld altogether
without infringing the constitutional right to an impartial
jury and a fair trial.  Denying a defendant a state-law right to
a peremptory challenge is not structural error.  The juror was
not challenged for cause, nor was there any claim that the
individual juror was biased.  The Court took care to point
out, and it is important to note here, that this was not a case
of an erroneous denial of a for-cause challenge (which would
deprive the defendant of an impartial jury).  Nor was this an
erroneous denial of a Batson objection (which would violate
the Equal Protection Clause) or an instance of a dismissal of
an otherwise death-eligible juror in violation of Witherspoon
v. Illinois.67 Nevertheless, Rivera established that erroneously
granting a Batson objection does not implicate federal law.  A
state might provide for automatic reversal under such cir-
cumstances as a matter of its own law, but no federal princi-
ple requires it to do so.
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
In Harbison v. Bell,68 the Supreme Court resolved a federal
statutory question that has important implications for the way
that both state and federal prisoners are represented toward
the end of capital litigation.  At issue was a federal statute, 18
U.S.C. § 3559, which provides for the appointment of counsel
for both state and federal capital defendants who bring federal
habeas corpus proceedings.  The statute also provides that
[T]he decision last
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unless the appointed lawyer is replaced, the attorney shall
represent the defendant through every subsequent stage of
available judicial proceedings “and shall also represent the
defendant in such competency proceedings and proceedings
for executive or other clemency as may be available to the
defendant.”69 The question was whether Harbison, who was
sentenced to death by a Tennessee state court, was entitled to
have his federal habeas corpus counsel continue to represent
him in state clemency proceedings at federal expense.  The
government argued that the statute only covered compensa-
tion for federal clemency proceedings, which are available
only to federal and not state defendants.
In a 7-2 decision, the Court ruled that the appointment con-
tinues through state clemency proceedings.  The opinion for
the Court, written by Justice Stevens, relies on the plain lan-
guage of the statute for this conclusion.  The majority noted
that the statute refers to clemency proceedings that “may be
available” and that only state clemency proceedings are avail-
able to defendants convicted in a state court.  Moreover, the
reference to “executive or other clemency” indicates that
Congress meant to include state proceedings, since some states
but not the federal government provide forms of clemency that
are other than executive.  The majority turned aside the claim
that this construction of the statute might also require feder-
ally appointed counsel to continue to represent clients in later
state habeas petitions or retrials, determining that these are not
subsequent stages of the federal habeas corpus proceedings.
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas concurred, but each
provided somewhat different reasoning.  Justices Scalia and
Alito dissented, contending that the federal statute provides
federally funded counsel for federal proceedings only.  The dis-
senters also rejected the majority’s attempt to distinguish sub-
sequent state habeas corpus litigation.
This is a significant ruling for courts and counsel that han-
dle capital post-conviction proceedings.  It ensures continuity
in representation and enables the federal post-conviction
lawyers to pursue clemency.  Since clemency is typically
sought near the end of the process, after federal habeas corpus
litigation has concluded, these lawyers have likely been repre-
senting the petitioner for a number of years and at this point
probably know the case and client best.  Even in states that
otherwise provide their own funding for capital clemency pro-
ceedings, it may be best for federal habeas counsel to make the
case for clemency, rather than appoint new lawyers so late in
the day.
FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW
The Supreme Court decided a number of federal criminal
cases last Term.  Here are several that may be of particular
interest.
Federal statutes have long prohibited felons from possess-
ing firearms.  Congress later extended this prohibition to peo-
ple convicted of “a misdemeanor crime of domestic vio-
lence.”70 The question in
United States v. Hayes71 was
whether a misdemeanor
battery conviction counts as
a “crime of domestic vio-
lence” when the victim was
the offender’s spouse, but
the predicate offense statute
did not require a domestic
relationship as an element
of the offense.  In a 7-2 deci-
sion that looked closely at
the language of the statute, the majority ruled that the gov-
ernment must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the vic-
tim of the predicate offense was the accused’s current or for-
mer spouse or related to the defendant in another specified
way.  That relationship, though it must be established as a
matter of fact, need not be denominated an element of the
predicate offense.  Dissenting, Justices Roberts and Scalia
would require domestic violence to be an element in the pred-
icate offense.  They found the text of the statute ambiguous
and would have applied the rule of lenity.  The holding may
be of broad interest as it makes clear some of the conse-
quences of a conviction for even a misdemeanor offense where
the facts involve acts of domestic violence.
Corley v. United States72 afforded the Court the opportunity
to determine whether the rule in McNabb v. United States73 and
Mallory v. United States74 had been abrogated by statute.  The
McNabb-Mallory rule generally makes inadmissible confes-
sions obtained during periods of detention that do not comply
with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5(a); Rule 5(a)
requires an officer who arrests a suspect on a federal charge to
bring the defendant before a judicial officer without unneces-
sary delay, though there are some exceptions.  The McNabb-
Mallory rule was based on the Court’s supervisory power.  In
1968, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 3501.  Section 3501(a)
provides that a confession is admissible if voluntarily given,
and § 3501(b) describes the factors that relate to voluntariness.
Section 3501(c) provides that a confession is not inadmissible
because of delay if it is voluntary and made within six hours of
arrest; the subsection provides exceptions for reasonable delay.
Did 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a), with its seemingly unequivocal com-
mand that voluntary confessions be admitted, displace
McNabb-Mallory?  In a 5-4 decision, the Court said no.
Writing for the majority, Justice Souter examined the whole
statute.  He noted that §§ 3501(a) and (b) were a (failed) leg-
islative attempt to eliminate Miranda for federal criminal pros-
ecutions,75 while § 3501(c) had an altogether different pur-
pose.  The government’s argument, which placed full weight
on subsection (a), would render subsection (c) superfluous.
Taking the statute as a whole, the Court concluded that §
3501 narrowed McNabb-Mallory but did not displace it.  Thus,
a district court with a suppression claim must determine
In a 7-2 decision,
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whether the defendant con-
fessed within six hours of
arrest, unless a longer delay
was reasonable.  If the con-
fession was made during
that time, it would be
admissible (subject to other
rules), so long as it was vol-
untary.  If the confession
occurred before the defen-
dant was brought before a
judicial officer and beyond
six hours, the trial court
must determine whether the
delay was unreasonable or
unnecessary under the
McNabb-Mallory rule.
Justice Alito authored the
dissent.  The dissenting jus-
tices would have applied §
3501 to displace McNabb-
Mallory even though it
would have made part (c) superfluous.  One other point of the
dissent is worth mentioning.  The four dissenters noted that
the Court has never held that the prompt presentment
requirements are backed by an automatic exclusionary sanc-
tion.  They also suggested that there was little need for
McNabb-Mallory given Miranda’s protections, a refrain that
recalls the holding in Montejo. 
Puckett v. United States76 addressed whether a forfeited
claim that the government violated the terms of a plea agree-
ment is subject to review on appeal as plain error.  Puckett
pled guilty and agreed to be truthful about his criminal activ-
ities.  At the time of the plea, the government agreed to rec-
ommend a reduction in his offense level under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines for acceptance of responsibility.
Puckett was sentenced several years later.  In the meantime,
he had helped another person defraud the government.  The
probation officer recommended that Puckett not receive any
reduction for acceptance of responsibility, and the prosecutor
then decided to oppose any such reduction.  Defense counsel
failed to object to the prosecutor’s changed position, and
Puckett did not receive the reduction.  The question on appeal
was whether the legal issue was forfeited or whether it could
be raised as plain error despite the failure to object.
In a 7-2 decision, the Supreme Court found that the plain-
error test of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) did not
apply and that the issue could not be raised.  The majority
opinion, written by Justice Scalia, points out the reasons for
requiring a contemporaneous objection:   including avoiding
sandbagging and giving the judge and the parties an opportu-
nity to resolve the mistake.  The Court rejected a number of
arguments raised by the defendant, including that a failure to
require the government to abide by the deal made the guilty
plea involuntary and that the government’s failure amounted
to structural error, affecting the framework within which the
proceeding operated.  Justices Souter and Stevens dissented.
While they did not find Puckett particularly sympathetic, they
argued that the prejudice to him was not the higher sentence
he ultimately received, but the loss of his right to a trial that he
waived as part of the agreement.   Even if the sentence would
have been the same, the government’s failure to live up to its
word branded Puckett a criminal without a trial because he
entered a guilty plea induced by a promise that the government
refused to honor.  This was plain error, said the dissenters.
The majority opinion contains one provocative suggestion.
While acknowledging that Santobello v. New York77 held that
automatic reversal is warranted when there is a timely objection
and the prosecution has breached a plea agreement, the Court
said there was no need to “confront today the question whether
Santobello’s automatic-reversal rule has survived our recent
elaboration of harmless-error principles” in other cases.78
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
Knowles v. Mirzayance79 raised the question whether a fed-
eral habeas corpus petitioner was entitled to relief when his
counsel advised him to withdraw his insanity defense.
Mirzayance pled not guilty and not guilty by reason of insan-
ity.  California, where he was tried, adjudicates such cases in
bifurcated proceedings.  Mirzayance was convicted of first-
degree murder in the guilt phase.  His lawyer advised
Mirzayance to withdraw the insanity defense prior to the
insanity phase.  Counsel concluded that the defense would
fail.  The Ninth Circuit granted relief, finding that failure to
pursue the insanity defense was deficient performance since
there was no tactical advantage in withdrawing the plea—in
essence, counsel had “nothing to lose” by presenting the
defense.
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed.  Justice
Thomas wrote for the Court that the state court’s rejection of
the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim was consistent
with Strickland.80 Counsel is not required to have a tactical
reason for dropping a weak claim, above and beyond a rea-
sonable appraisal of the claim’s prospects for success.  Nor is
counsel required to raise every non-frivolous defense.  And
under these circumstances, Mirzayance could not show preju-
dice.  There was no reasonable probability that he would have
prevailed on the insanity defense had he pursued it.  In addi-
tion, in a part of the opinion that commanded six votes, the
Court also ruled that Mirzayance could not show that the
state-court decision was contrary to or involved an unreason-
able application of “clearly established Federal law, as deter-
mined by the Supreme Court,” which is the showing man-
dated by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA).81 No U.S. Supreme Court decision had previously
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established a “nothing to lose” standard.  Under the “doubly
deferential” standard that applies to Strickland allegations
evaluated under AEDPA, Mirzayance could not prevail with a
generalized Strickland claim.82
Jury Instructions
The issue in Hedgpeth v. Pulido83 was whether a particular
instructional error is structural or whether it is subject to
harmless-error analysis.  Pulido was charged with felony mur-
der.  The jury was instructed on alternative theories of guilt,
one of which was invalid, and may have relied on the invalid
theory to convict (though that was not certain, as the jury
returned a general verdict).  The district court granted
Pulido’s federal habeas corpus petition, finding that the flawed
instruction had a “substantial and injurious effect” or influ-
ence on the verdict, the standard set forth in Brecht v.
Abrahamson.84 The State appealed.  The Ninth Circuit
affirmed but rather than apply Brecht, the court of appeals
determined that the error was structural and not subject to
harmless-error review.
The Supreme Court reversed in a 6-3 per curiam decision.
The majority distinguished several earlier rulings85 that sup-
ported Pulido because those cases were decided before the
Supreme Court determined in Chapman v. California86 that
constitutional errors can be harmless.  The Court was more
persuaded by recent holdings that other forms of instructional
error are subject to harmless-error review.  The matter was
remanded for the court of appeals to assess whether the error
was harmless under Brecht; the majority declined to apply
Brecht in the first instance.  Justices Stevens, Souter, and
Ginsburg dissented, contending that the court of appeals’
analysis and the record clearly show that the error was not
harmless under Brecht. 
Timeliness/Default
In Jimenez v. Quarterman,87 the Court addressed a not
uncommon question:  whether a federal habeas corpus peti-
tion was timely filed under AEDPA’s one-year statute of limi-
tations, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).  Section 2244 provides that
the year begins to run on “the date on which the judgment
became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expira-
tion of the time for seeking such review.”  Jimenez’s state
appellate lawyer filed an Anders88 brief, which he left for
Jimenez at the county jail.  Unfortunately, Jimenez was no
longer at the jail, and so he received neither the brief nor the
subsequent order of dismissal.  When he later learned of the
error, he filed a state habeas corpus petition and asked the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals for leave to file an out-of-
time appeal.  That court granted him leave.  The appeal was
filed, and the conviction was affirmed.  Jimenez later filed a
federal habeas corpus petition within a year of the conclusion
of his reopened avenue of appeal.  The lower federal courts,
however, considered the
one-year period to begin to
run from the conclusion of
the initial appeal, not
Jimenez’s reopened path of
review.
The Supreme Court
reversed in a unanimous
opinion written by Justice
Thomas.  The Court held
that direct review does not
conclude until the avail-
ability of direct appeal to
the state courts and to the
U.S. Supreme Court has
been exhausted.  Once the
Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals reopened the
direct review of the conviction, the petitioner’s conviction was
no longer final for purposes of the federal habeas corpus
statute.  This construction furthered AEDPA’s goal of promot-
ing comity, finality, and federalism since it permitted the state
court the first opportunity to review the claim and to address
any constitutional errors. 
Cone v. Bell89 dealt with an issue of procedural default.
Cone raised an insanity defense in his murder trial but was
convicted and sentenced to death.  His defense was based in
part upon his drug use, which the prosecution discredited at
trial.  Years afterwards, Cone learned that the State had sup-
pressed evidence of his drug use, and he then asserted a vio-
lation of Brady v. Maryland.90 The case had a complicated pro-
cedural history, but the bottom line was that due to the late
disclosure of this evidence and the way the case was litigated,
the state courts never considered the merits of the Brady claim
in light of this newly disclosed evidence (and in fact the state
courts had found that the claim was waived or otherwise
defaulted).  The State reasserted its arguments of default in
federal court.
In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that the claim
was not barred.  In federal habeas corpus litigation, the ade-
quacy of state procedural bars is itself a federal question.  The
majority determined that the state courts had not passed on
the merits of the claim, and that the state courts had erred in
finding that the Brady claim was defaulted or waived.  The
majority went on to consider the merits of the claim.  The
Court decided that the likelihood was remote that the sup-
pressed evidence would have affected the jury’s verdict on the
issue of insanity but that the evidence may have been mater-
ial to the jury’s assessment of the proper punishment.  The
majority remanded to the district court to consider the merits
of the claim with respect to the sentence.  Justices Thomas














91. 129 S.Ct. 855 (2009).
92. 129 S.Ct. 808 (2009).
93. 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009).
94. 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
95. 129 S. Ct. 2308 (2009).
not defaulted, they would
have rejected the entire Brady
claim on the merits.  Justice
Alito would have remanded
for further proceedings,
including a question of
whether the Brady claim was
fully exhausted or barred.
CIVIL RIGHTS
Four civil-rights cases
from last Term may also be of interest to criminal-court judges
and practitioners.  Three of the rulings underscore some of
the difficulties for federal civil-rights plaintiffs in suing prose-
cutors and law-enforcement officers.  The fourth case
addresses whether § 1983 may be used to obtain DNA evi-
dence and also contains important holdings about Brady, the
Due Process Clause, and claims of actual innocence.
The trio of civil-rights cases are Van de Kamp v. Goldstein,91
Pearson v. Callahan,92 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal.93 Van de Kamp was
a suit against a county district attorney and a supervising
prosecutor alleging that the defendants failed to train prose-
cutors, supervise them, or establish a system so that exculpa-
tory information relating to jailhouse informants would be
disclosed to defense counsel.  A unanimous Court determined
that the prosecutors were absolutely immune from liability,
turning aside an argument that the defendants should not
receive absolute immunity as these alleged failures were
administrative and not prosecutorial conduct.  
Pearson overruled Saucier v. Katz,94 which had instructed
federal courts to follow a two-step process in determining
whether government officials were entitled to qualified immu-
nity:  first, whether there was a constitutional violation, and
second, whether the unconstitutionality of the officers’ con-
duct was clearly established.  Pearson now gives judges the
discretion to determine which prong should be addressed first
(and thus a case may be dismissed on qualified-immunity
grounds by going to the second prong without deciding
whether there was a constitutional violation at all).  The
Pearson Court thus determined that officers were entitled to
immunity without deciding an interesting Fourth
Amendment question about the constitutionality of a war-
rantless entry into a home when consent to enter was given to
an undercover informant (sometimes called “consent-once-
removed”). 
Iqbal, which may be the most significant of the trio,
involved allegations that the plaintiff was selected for pretrial
detention in a federal maximum security unit and subjected to
beatings and other abuses on the basis of his race, religion,
and national origin.  He alleged that Attorney General
Ashcroft and FBI Director Mueller knew about and condoned
this discriminatory treatment and may even have been instru-
mental in adopting and executing the discriminatory policy.
A closely divided Court found that there can be no supervi-
sory liability for knowledge of and mere acquiescence in an
unconstitutional action by a subordinate.  Next, the majority
decided that the allegations against the two officials were
insufficiently detailed to meet ordinary pleading require-
ments, that of presenting plausible (and not merely conceiv-
able) claims of invidious discrimination.  Iqbal has enormous
importance with respect to civil-pleading standards and, of
course, the principles of supervisory liability.
The final case, District Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial
District v. Osborne,95 was the government’s appeal from a rul-
ing in a § 1983 civil-rights action granting a former defendant
access to evidence for DNA testing.  Osborne was convicted of
a violent sexual assault in a state court in Alaska.  Before his
trial, the State tested a sperm sample found at the crime scene
using a somewhat nondiscriminating test.  In postconviction
proceedings, Osborne sought access to better and more dis-
criminating DNA testing, but access was denied.  The lower
federal courts, however, found that he had a potentially viable
claim of actual innocence and that he had a right of access to
evidence to perform DNA testing.  The Supreme Court
reversed.
In a 5-4 decision authored by Chief Justice Roberts, the
Court emphasized that the dilemma of figuring out how to
harness DNA’s power to prove innocence without unnecessar-
ily interfering with the criminal justice system belongs pri-
marily to the legislatures of the various states.  The majority
noted that Osborne had a state-created liberty interest in
demonstrating his innocence (since Alaska law provides that
those who use newly discovered evidence to establish inno-
cence may vacate their conviction or sentence) but that
Alaska’s procedures were adequate under the Due Process
Clause.  The justices underscored the differences between the
process due an individual before conviction and after convic-
tion and noted that Brady did not apply.  Several justices con-
curred to emphasize a few additional concerns, such as the
use of civil-rights actions to bring claims that potentially
might be brought on habeas corpus, as well as the burdens
that postconviction DNA testing imposes upon federal and
state governments.  Justice Stevens wrote the main dissent.
Four justices would have found that the State’s procedures did
not comport with the Due Process Clause.  Three of the dis-
senting justices would also have found a substantive due-
process right of access to evidence for purposes of previously
unavailable DNA testing.
A LOOK AHEAD
The October 2009 Term also promises to be quite signifi-
cant.  As the Term opens, the justices plan to revisit some
issues that have commanded a fair amount of attention in
recent years; cases involving the Second Amendment,
Apprendi, and the Confrontation Clause are again on the
docket.  The Court also will address several aspects of
Miranda, as well as an assortment of other matters.  Here are
some of the most interesting cases.
Four civil-rights
cases from last
Term may also be
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The blockbuster case of two Terms ago was District of
Columbia v. Heller,96 where the justices ruled that the Second
Amendment protects an individual’s right to keep and bear
arms.  Now the Court has granted review in McDonald v.
Chicago97 to determine whether this right is incorporated as
against the states through the Privileges and Immunities or
Due Process clauses.  
The Court will take on yet another Apprendi issue, deciding
in United States v. O’Brien98 whether the fact that a firearm is a
machine gun must be charged and proved to a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt before a defendant may be given a 30-year
mandatory minimum sentence. 
Miranda is front-and-center.  Maryland v. Shatzer,99 a
closely watched case, concerns how long the Edwards v.
Arizona prohibition against reinterrogation may last.  While in
prison on one charge, Shatzer invoked his right to counsel
during an investigation of a different sexual abuse charge.
Still in prison more than 2-1/2 years later, he was re-interro-
gated by a different detective.  The Maryland Court of Appeals
ruled that the Edwards prohibition remained effective and that
there had been no break in custody.  The state court deter-
mined that it would apply Edwards absent further guidance
from the Supreme Court.  Another Miranda issue is presented
in Florida v. Powell,100 which addresses whether Miranda
warnings are defective if they fail to include advice of the right
to talk to a lawyer during questioning (as opposed to before
questioning).  The ruling may have broad implications
because the social science literature has reported a remarkable
variation in the form, language, and understandability of
warnings used by law-enforcement agencies.101
But perhaps the most important of the three Miranda cases
is Berghuis v. Thompkins,102 where officers continued to ques-
tion a suspect who remained largely silent for the first two
hours and 45 minutes of his interrogation.  The case has great
practical and theoretical implications.  With a number of law-
enforcement agencies regularly seeking implied and not
express waivers of Miranda,103 the case should help clarify the
role of officers when a suspect simply does what the warnings
promise him he may do:  remain silent.  The case may provide
an opportunity to determine whether the Davis v. United
States104 “clear invocation” rule should be extended to the
right to remain silent as well as the right to counsel, and
whether the rule should also be extended to the initial waiver
stage (as opposed to coming into play only to determine
whether a defendant who initially waived his rights has
changed his mind and is now
invoking them).  The matter
is before the Court on a
habeas corpus petition, how-
ever, and the resolution of
these questions may be com-
plicated by the standard of
review under AEDPA. 
Other issues about the
federal habeas corpus statute
post-AEDPA will also
occupy the Court.  Among
the cases this Term are
McDaniel v. Brown,105 which
addresses how a federal
habeas corpus court can adjudicate a “sufficiency-of-the-evi-
dence” claim under AEDPA, and Berguis v. Smith,106 which
concerns the review of an alleged violation of the Sixth
Amendment’s fair cross-section requirement post-AEDPA.
Also on the docket is Holland v. Florida,107 which relates to the
circumstances in which a petitioner may be entitled to equi-
table tolling to excuse the late filing of a petition.  
Two other much anticipated cases are Graham v. Florida108
and Sullivan v. Florida.109 They deal with whether the Eighth
Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishments forbids
imposing life without parole sentences on juveniles who are
not convicted of homicide offenses.
Another case that may be of wide interest is Padilla v.
Kentucky,110 where the justices will decide if a lawyer who
gives erroneous advice about the immigration consequences
of a conviction is constitutionally ineffective.  The Court
might additionally consider whether a lawyer representing a
non-citizen has a duty to give advice about those immigration
consequences.
The Court also plans to decide the constitutionality of sev-
eral federal statutes.  United States v. Stevens111 asks whether a
federal law criminalizing the creation, sale, and possession of
“depiction[s] of animal cruelty” is facially invalid under the
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.  The Third
Circuit overturned the conviction of the defendant, a film-
maker, and the government sought Supreme Court review.
Carr v. United States112 asks whether a federal law that imposes
registration requirements on sex offenders can be applied to
individuals whose predicate offenses and proscribed travel
took place before the statute was passed.
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Finally, white-collar-crime aficionados might note the bevy
of mail-fraud questions that are on the docket.  Black v. United
States113 concerns whether a person may be convicted under
the federal mail-fraud statute for depriving another of “the
intangible right of honest services,” even if there is no finding
that the defendant contemplated economic harm to the party
to whom “honest services” were owed.  The Court also
granted review in Weyhrauch v. United States,114 another case
interpreting the same statute.  There the question is whether
a state official may be convicted of depriving the public of the
defendant’s honest services for allegedly failing to disclose
conflicts of interest without proof of a separate duty of disclo-
sure imposed by state law.  And the conviction of former
Enron executive Jeffrey Skilling is before the Court in a case
that raises an issue of the meaning of honest-services fraud as
well as how the prosecution may rebut a presumption of jury
prejudice that may arise from massive pretrial publicity.115
The present Term will be quite interesting to watch.
Charles D. Weisselberg is the Shannon Cecil
Turner Professor of Law at the University of
California, Berkeley, where he has taught since
1998.  He taught at the University of Southern
California School of Law from 1987 to 1998,
and he was previously in public and private
practice.  Weisselberg served as the founding
director of Berkeley Law’s in-house clinical
program, the Center for Clinical Education.  He teaches criminal
procedure, criminal law, and related courses.  Weisselberg
received his B.A. from The Johns Hopkins University in 1979 and
his J.D. from the University of Chicago in 1982.  Professor
Weisselberg gratefully acknowledges the research assistance of
Alisa Givental.
74 Court Review - Volume 45 
Court Review, the quarterly journal of the American Judges
Association, invites the submission of unsolicited, original articles,
essays, and book reviews.  Court Review seeks to provide practical,
useful information to the working judges of the United States and
Canada.  In each issue, we hope to provide information that will be
of use to judges in their everyday work, whether in highlighting new
procedures or methods of trial, court, or case management, provid-
ing substantive information regarding an area of law likely to
encountered by many judges, or by providing background informa-
tion (such as psychology or other social science research) that can be
used by judges in their work.
Court Review is received by the 2,500 members of the American
Judges Association (AJA), as well as many law libraries.  About 40
percent of the members of the AJA are general-jurisdiction, state trial
judges.  Another 40 percent are limited-jurisdiction judges, includ-
ing municipal court and other specialized court judges.  The remain-
der include federal trial judges, state and federal appellate judges,
and administrative-law judges.
Articles:  Articles should be submitted in double-spaced text with
footnotes, preferably in Word format (although WordPerfect format
can also be accepted).  The suggested article length for Court Review
is between 18 and 36 pages of double-spaced text (including the
footnotes).  Footnotes should conform to the current edition of The
Bluebook:  A Uniform System of Citation.  Articles should be of a qual-
ity consistent with better-state-bar-association law journals and/or
other law reviews.
Essays:  Essays should be submitted in the same format as articles.
Suggested length is between 6 and 12 pages of double-spaced text
(including any footnotes).
Book Reviews:  Book reviews should be submitted in the same for-
mat as articles.  Suggested length is between 3 and 9 pages of dou-
ble-spaced text (including any footnotes).
Pre-commitment:  For previously published authors, we will con-
sider making a tentative publication commitment based upon an
article outline.  In addition to the outline, a comment about the spe-
cific ways in which the submission will be useful to judges and/or
advance scholarly discourse on the subject matter would be appreci-
ated.  Final acceptance for publication cannot be given until a com-
pleted article, essay, or book review has been received and reviewed
by the Court Review editor or board of editors.
Editing: Court Review reserves the right to edit all manuscripts.  
Submission:  Submissions may be made either by mail or e-mail.
Please send them to Court Review’s editors:  Judge Steve Leben, 301
S.W. 10th Ave., Suite 278, Topeka, Kansas 66612, email address:
sleben@ix.netcom.com; or Professor Alan Tomkins, 215 Centennial
Mall South, Suite 401, PO Box 880228, Lincoln, Nebraska 68588-
0228, email address: atomkins@nebraska.edu.  Submissions will be
acknowledged by mail; letters of acceptance or rejection will be sent
following review.
Court Review Author Submission Guidelines
Authors’ Note: The authors would like to thank Ashley Dolezilek, the
National Judicial College, and the National Council for Juvenile and
Family Court Judges for their assistance with this project. This research
was partially funded by the American Psychology-Law Society. Contact
the authors through David Flores (dflores@unr.edu).
Footnotes 
1. Associated Press, Man Who Hit Juror in First Trial Threatens Panel
during Retrial, BostonGlobe.com, May 30, 2007. http://www.
bos ton . com/news / loca l /massachuse t t s / a r t i c l e s /2007
/05/30/man_who_hit_juror_in_first_trial_threatens_panel_
during_retrial/.
2. Associated Press, Judge Nearly Shot in Courtroom, msnbc.com,
May 8, 2007, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/18559142/.
3. Bill Mears, Justice Ginsburg Details Death Threat, CNN.COM,
March, 15, 2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/LAW/03/15/
scotus.threat/.
4. Associated Press, Judge Shot, Wounded at Nevada Courthouse,
USATODAY.COM, June 13, 2006, http://www.usatoday.com/
news/nation/2006-06-12-judge_x.htm.
5. Associated Press, Nichols Wanted to Be with His Baby Boy,
FOXNEWS.COM, March, 16, 2005, http://www.foxnews.com/
story/0,2933,150683,00.html.
6. Jeff Coen & David Heinzmann, Suicide, Double-Murder Linked,
CHI. TRIB., March 11, 2005, available at http://www.ocregister
.com/ocr/2005/03/11/sections/nation_world/nation_world/
article_438555.php.
7. Jared Chamberlain & Monica K. Miller, Stress in the Courtroom: A
Call for Research (Sept. 19, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with the author) [hereinafter Chamberlain, Call for Research].
8. For a review, see Monica K. Miller & Brian H. Bornstein, Juror
Stress: Causes and Interventions, 30 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 237 (2004)
[hereinafter Miller, Causes and Interventions]; Monica K. Miller, &
David M. Flores. Addressing the Problem of Courtroom Stress, 91
JUDICATURE 60 (Sept./Oct.  2007) [hereinafter, Miller, Courtroom
Stress].
9. E.g., Brian H. Bornstein, Monica K. Miller, Robert J. Nemeth,
Gregory L. Page, & Sarah Musil, Juror Reactions to Jury Duty:
Perceptions of the System and Potential Stressors, 23 BEHAV. SCI. & L.
231 (2005) [hereinafter Bornstein, Juror Reactions]; Theodore B.
Feldmann & Roger A. Bell, Crisis Debriefing of a Jury After a
Murder Trial, 42 HOSPITAL & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 79 (1991)
[hereinafter Feldmann, Crisis Debriefing]; Roger A. Bell &
Theodore B. Feldmann, Crisis Debriefing of Juries: A Follow-Up, 4
AM. J. PREVENTATIVE PSYCHIATRY 2 (1992) [hereinafter Bell, Crisis
Debriefing Follow-Up]; Thomas L. Hafemeister & W. Larry Ventis,
Juror Stress: What Burden Have We Placed on Our Juries?, 16 ST. CT.
J. 35 (1992) [hereinafter Hafemeister, Juror Stress]; National
Center for State Courts, THROUGH THE EYES OF THE JUROR: A
MANUAL FOR ADDRESSING JUROR STRESS 1 (1998 ed.)[hereinafter
NCSC, 1998 Manual].
10. Donald J. Harris, Charlotte L. Kirschner, Kristina Klatt Rozek, &
Neil Alan Weiner, Violence in the Judicial Workplace: One State’s
Experience, ANNALS AM. ACAD. 38, (2001) [hereinafter, Harris,
Judicial Workplace]; Peter G. Jaffe, Claire V. Crooks, Billie L.
Dunford-Jackson & Michael Town, Vicarious Trauma in Judges:
The Personal Challenge of Dispensing Justice, JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 1
(2003) [hereinafter Jaffe, Vicarious Trauma in Judges]. 
The courtroom represents a critical component of theAmerican justice system. The legal system asks judgesand juries to deliver justice for injured parties through
the cases that they decide. The assumption is that these legal
decision-makers can perform these tasks rationally and fairly.
This is not always an easy task, however, as the process can
expose judges and jurors to a number of stressors that can have
negative consequences for both the individuals and the legal
system as a whole. First, some trials contain graphic evidence
regarding crimes and personal injuries. Judges and jurors are
captive audiences and have no choice about viewing pho-
tographs and hearing testimony concerning such violent
crimes as murder, abuse, and rape. Second, the safety of both
judges and jurors can sometimes be compromised during trial.
For instance, a defendant in a recent trial in Boston punched a
juror, leading the judge to declare a mistrial. During the defen-
dant’s second trial, the defendant threatened to kill the jurors.1
Judges also have safety concerns:  a judge in New York barely
avoided being shot when a former defendant fired a sawed off
rifle in the courtroom.2 Other judges have been threatened,3
injured,4 or killed5 while on the job. Some judges have also
experienced violence outside of the courtroom; for instance, in
2005, a man killed U.S. District Judge Joan Lefkow’s husband
and mother as an act of retribution for her rulings.6
Stress and safety concerns have the potential to affect
judges’ and jurors’ performances. For instance, jurors selected
for a trial involving a violent crime may experience strong
emotions that make it difficult to follow the jury instructions.
Judges could also let emotions affect their sentencing judg-
ments or prevent them from making proper decisions (e.g.,
about impermissible testimony).7 Fear of retribution could
affect the decisions of both judges and jurors, for example, in
gang-related cases. Because stress has the potential to nega-
tively impact the judicial system, researchers have begun to
study courtroom stress.8 The majority of research concerns
juror stress,9 although several studies have examined judicial
stress or judges’ perceptions of their safety.10
The present research is designed to expand on previous
research by asking research questions concerning five related
areas. First, are judges concerned about juror stress? To the
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degree that they are, what steps are they taking to protect
jurors? Second, how do judges experience stress personally?
What experiences are most stressful and how do judges cope?
Third, how do judges feel about personal safety, and what do
they do to protect themselves and their families? Fourth, is
there a relationship between judges’ perceptions of safety and
their experiences of stress? Finally, are there differences in
judges’ perceptions? Specifically does one gender experience
greater stress than the other? Do judges who have experienced
a stressful work event (e.g., a threat) have different perceptions
from those who have not? By answering these important ques-
tions, the current exploratory research can help determine
what steps can be taken to protect judges and jurors from
excessive stress that can impede their performance. 
STRESS IN THE COURTROOM
A number of researchers have studied the stress that judges
and jurors experience.11 These studies (reviewed below) have
determined that jurors do experience stress as a result of a vari-
ety of stressors. As a result, some courts have taken measures
(e.g., posttrial debriefings) to protect jurors.12 Somewhat less
attention has been given to the study of judicial stress and
safety, although there is some evidence that judges also experi-
ence negative effects associated with their duties.13 A review of
the literature in both areas provides a foundation for the cur-
rent study.
Evidence of juror stress. Serving as a juror can be difficult or
stressful for a variety of reasons. Some of these stressors are fairly
obvious, such as deciding on a verdict/sentence, being involved
in heated jury deliberations, and hearing about violent or grue-
some crimes.14 In highly sensationalized cases involving “noto-
rious” defendants (e.g., O.J. Simpson, Martha Stewart), there
can also be stress due to intense media scrutiny and/or seques-
tration.15 Less obvious and more mundane stressors occur in
more run-of-the-mill cases as well. For example, Bornstein and
colleagues16 found that in a sample of mostly routine cases,
stress levels were relatively low overall. Nonetheless, jurors still
reported experiencing some stress associated with the experi-
ence. The most stressful elements of jury duty involved:  trial
complexity (e.g., difficulty understanding the law or testimony),
the decision-making process (e.g., having limited input), and
disruption to daily life (e.g., long days in court). Although
courts can do relatively little about some of these concerns (e.g.,
the nature of the crime or the necessity of reaching a verdict),
others can be addressed by procedural reforms, such as allowing
jurors to ask questions, modifying judge’s instructions, and pro-
viding more frequent breaks.17
Several studies have documented significant, albeit sub-
clinical, stress reactions among jurors, especially in cases
involving gruesome testimony, high media interest, or severe
penalties for defendants.18 Documented stress symptoms
among jurors include anxiety, sleeplessness, headaches, hives,
and high blood pressure.19 Very few studies have examined the
duration of juror stress posttrial; those few studies indicate
that symptoms can last for several months after trial,20 though
they do abate somewhat.21
Courts have a number of tools available to reduce juror stress,
which can be implemented at various stages of the process.22 For
example, courts can (1) inoculate jurors against stress through
pretrial orientation; (2) lessen stress during trial by reducing
complexity and being more sensitive to jurors’ routine needs
(e.g., work schedules); and (3) address stress posttrial through
debriefings. There is little systematic research on debriefing’s
effectiveness, but jurors do tend to perceive it as helpful.23
Judges can be highly involved in all of these stress-reduc-
tion methods, especially those occurring during and after
trial.24 There are a number of practical issues surrounding
interventions designed to reduce juror stress, such as who pays
for them, who conducts them, etc.25 For example, posttrial
debriefings can be conducted by either the judge (or other
court personnel) or a mental-health professional. The National
Center for State Courts (NCSC) study found that judges them-
selves perceived debriefings led by judges as more beneficial
than those led by mental-health professionals.26 Although no
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study has assessed the effectiveness of debriefing as a function
of who conducts it, it is certainly plausible that judges would
be more effective, by virtue of their authority and having lived
through the same experience as jurors; nonetheless, this
approach begs the question:  Who debriefs the judge?
Evidence of judicial stress. Judges experience a number of
stressors, such as substantial workloads, traumatic cases, pres-
sure of making significant decisions, and safety concerns.27 As
a result, judges can experience stress symptoms such as sleep
disturbances, intolerance of others, depression, and isolation.28
The NCSC study found that 50% of judges report experiencing
high levels of stress during a trial.29 Although this question was
quite general, other studies and theoretical models have inves-
tigated more specific aspects of judicial stress. 
Miller and Richardson30 propose a model suggesting that
stress can have a number of causes and consequences. The
model predicts that a variety of factors can cause stress and
safety concerns, which in turn can then lead to various out-
comes. The model suggests three types of factors that can
cause stress and safety concerns:  Personal (e.g., gender), job
(e.g., high number of stressful trials), and environmental char-
acteristics (e.g., awareness of violent acts against other judges).
The model suggests that some of these characteristics have a
direct effect on stress; however, they may also affect stress indi-
rectly. Specifically, a factor can affect safety concerns, which in
turn lead to stress. Stress can lead to a variety of outcomes,
including problems with health, personal relationships, and
job performance.
This model is based on previous research with other groups
(e.g., counselors, emergency medical personnel), and relies on
previous studies researching secondary traumatic stress, work-
related burnout, vicarious trauma, and Constructivist Self-
Development Theory.31 Although the model itself has yet to be
tested, other research supports its basic propositions. For
instance, Chamberlain and Miller32 conducted interviews and
found that judges experience vicarious trauma, resulting from
witnessing victimization of others.33 Jaffe and colleagues34 also
found support for the notion that judges experience vicarious
trauma; 63% of the 105 judges included in the study reported
experiencing at least one symptom of vicarious trauma. Judges
who play the role of caretaker (e.g., deciding whether a child
should remain with parents) are especially likely to experience
vicarious trauma due to witnessing the traumas experienced
by the individuals under the judge’s care. 
As a result of their work experiences, judges can also face
unfavorable effects as predicted by Constructivist Self-
Development Theory (CSDT). Applied to judges, CSDT would
posit that trauma affects a judge’s psychological needs; these
needs are related to the individual’s sense of safety, trust,
esteem, independence, power, and intimacy.35 If these needs
are unmet, the judge’s view of the world and the self will
change. Miller36 found at least moderate evidence that judges
who had experienced a traumatic event had also experienced
symptoms in accord with CSDT. Occupational burnout is also
a risk for judges. Judges report difficulty making decisions,
work blocks, and negative feelings about their profession,37
which could indicate work-related burnout. Judges also expe-
rience a variety of other symptoms associated with burnout.38
Judges experience a variety of safety issues as well. Harris
and colleagues39 surveyed judges about their experiences with
work-related safety issues. Over half (52%) of the 1,112 judges
questioned had been threatened in some way. Seventy percent
of these incidents occurred outside the courthouse, indicating
that threatening situations are not limited to the workplace.
Fifty-eight percent of judges felt it was necessary to change
their behavior in light of these threats. Similarly, Chamberlain
and Miller40 found that many judges had significant concerns
for their safety, both in and out of the courthouse.
Finally, there is evidence that judges are sensitive to jurors’
stress.41 A national survey of judges indicated that most believe
that jurors typically experience low to moderate stress levels.
Nevertheless, 29% of judges felt that stress affects the ability of
at least some jurors. Additionally, 65% of judges believe that
people avoid jury duty because they fear stress, and 77% had
excused a potential or actual juror because of the juror was
experiencing or would likely experience stress. Nearly all
(97%) judges said that they believed courts have a responsibil-
ity to prevent, address, or minimize stress; 78% said they had
used at least one strategy to do so. The most common strate-
gies were (1) attempting to maintain a positive rapport with
jurors, (2) explaining the trial process to jurors before trial, (3)
limiting delays, (4) asking jurors their wishes about
lunchtime, etc., and (5) instructing court officials to be sensi-
tive to juror needs.
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To date, there is considerably more research concerning
jurors’ stress than judges’ stress.42 This is a concern because
judges have to deal with more potentially stressful evidence
than jurors as they have to determine the admissibility of evi-
dence that jurors might not see (e.g., gruesome evidence).43 In
addition, judges have to deal with such hassles daily, while
jurors experience such trials very infrequently. Frequent expe-
riences with such stressors could be detrimental and could
lead to mental-health issues (e.g., vicarious trauma) or desen-
sitization. Just as with jurors, some of the stressors that affect
judges are obvious and hard to remediate (e.g., presiding over
cases with disturbing evidence, sentencing in capital cases),
while others are more mundane and more amenable to reme-
diation (e.g., workload, lack of training/preparation44). 
As Chamberlain & Miller45 point out, more research is
needed to understand judges’ experiences with stress. The liter-
ature on jury and judge safety and stress has some limitations.
The first concern this exploratory study addresses is the limited
scope of previous studies. While previous studies concerning
judicial stress46 investigate very specific types of stressors or
symptoms (e.g., vicarious trauma, occupational burnout,
Constructivist Self-Development Theory), the current study is
much broader in scope. Second, the current study expands on
previous research by using more formal measures of stress,
depression and anxiety. Shuman and colleagues47 and Bornstein
and colleagues48 used clinical measures (e.g., scales measuring
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, depression, and anxiety) with
jurors, but these measures have yet to be used with judges.
Third, the current study fills a gap in the research by identify-
ing differences based on individual factors. That is, does gender,
experience with a work-related stressful issue (e.g., violence),
or the type of cases a judge typically handles affect his/her per-
ceptions and behaviors? In addition, the current study links
stress and safety to determine the relationship between the vari-
ables. Finally, not much is known about what steps judges take
to address their safety and stress needs or the needs of jurors.
This is important, yet largely unknown, information that can
help courts protect these legal decision makers.
In an effort to address this void, this exploratory study sur-
veyed judges to gather tentative evidence on five major
research questions:
Research Question 1: How do judges feel about juror
stress? What have they done to protect jurors?
Research Question 2: How do judges experience stress
personally? What aspects of their occupational duties are
most stressful, and how do they cope?
Research Question 3: How do judges feel about personal
safety? What do they do to protect themselves and their
families?
Research Question 4: Is there a relationship between
judges’ perceptions of safety and their experiences of
stress?
Research Question 5: Are there differences in experiences
of stress or perceptions of safety with respect to gender,
the type of cases that the judge typically presides over, or
the experience of a workplace safety issue?
METHOD
Participants
A convenience sample of 163 American trial judges partici-
pated in the current study. The responders included 95 (58%)
males, 65 (40%) females, and 3 (2%) who  chose not to indi-
cate gender. Sixty-six (40.2%) indicated they had experienced
a “work-related stress/safety incident,” answering affirmatively
to the question “In the past year, did you experience any work-
related event that caused you stress (e.g., a violent or threaten-
ing event)?”
When asked what type of trial they typically presided over,
35 respondents (21%) indicated civil trials, 21 (12%) criminal,
74 (45%) both, and 33 (20%) responded “Other.” The respon-
dents included 67 (41%) from general jurisdiction courts, 48
(29%) from family courts, 46 (28%) from state supreme courts,
and 2 (1%) from appellate courts. Analyses revealed no signifi-
cant differences with respect to the type of trial a judge typically
presided over or the classification of judge. As a consequence,
these distinctions are omitted from the discussion of results.
Procedure
Participants were affiliated with either the University of
Nevada Reno Judicial Studies graduate program for trial judges
or the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges
(NCJFCJ). Prospective participants were sent an email request-
ing their participation in a study about the causes and impli-
cations of judicial stress. The correspondence included a brief
description of the study and a link to a secure online survey
site that hosted the survey.
Materials
The online survey consisted of 167 items, which took par-
ticipants approximately 30-45 minutes to complete. In order to
address the individual research questions, numerous instru-
ment items targeted respondents’ perceptions of jury stress and
judges’ own experiences with stress and safety issues (a more
detailed discussion of which is included in the foregoing analy-
ses). In an effort to build upon previous research, the instru-
ment also included several clinical measures for use as depen-
dant variables, including the Center for Epidemiology Studies
Depression Scale,49 a brief form of the Speilberger State
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Anxiety Inventory developed by Chlan and colleagues,50 and
seven items from a Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder diagnostic
tool51 utilized by Bornstein and colleagues52 in their work on
jury stress. Demographic questions including gender and
nature of the respondents’ judicial positions were also
included. Finally, judges indicated whether they had experi-
enced any work-related event that caused stress in the past
year.
RESULTS
Dealing with Juror Stress
The first research question focused on whether judges feel
responsible for juror stress. Judges were asked their general
level of responsibility and what strategies they have used to
reduce jurors’ stress. Differences based on gender and experi-
ence with a work-related stress/safety incident were investi-
gated to address Research Question 5. 
Responsibility for Juror Stress. Judges were asked to indi-
cate if they believed the court has a responsibility to prevent,
address, or minimize juror stress on a seven-point scale (1 = no
responsibility; 7 = full responsibility). Descriptive statistics
revealed that judges assume a moderate to high amount of
responsibility for juror stress (M = 5.47, Mdn = 6.0, SD = 1.15).
Independent-sample t-tests revealed no significant differences
based on gender or experience with a work-related stress/safety
incident (all ps > .51). 
Stress-Reduction Strategies. Judges were also asked to indi-
cate what steps they had taken to reduce juror stress by check-
ing items on a list of 41 potential strategies (compiled by the
researchers). Some examples of strategies included “encourage
or grant a change of venue” and “shorten length of court days
for jurors.” Thirty-six judges were not included in this analy-
sis because they indicated that they did not work with juries.
The most commonly used strategies were (in order):  (1)
Explaining the trial process to jurors before the trial; (2)
attempting to maintain positive rapport with jurors; (3)
instructing court officials to be sensitive to jurors’ needs; (4)
asking jurors about their wishes about lunchtime, quitting
time, etc., (5) explaining jury instructions; and (6) limiting
delays. Seven judges also indicated other strategies that they
used to prevent juror stress, many of which focused on estab-
lishing a good relationship with jurors, instilling confidence in
jurors, and reassuring jurors about any uncertainties about the
trial. A full summary of the frequency of strategies used by
judges to prevent juror stress is provided in Table 1.
An aggregate “strategy use” variable was created to deter-
mine if there were any differences in frequency of strategy use
TABLE 1: NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF STRATEGIES 




Encourage or grant a change of venue n = 2; 1.6%
Encourage or grant a delay in beginning of trial n = 13; 10%
Specifically address possible trial stress during voir dire n = 44; 34%
Permit attorneys to address trial stress during voir dire n = 37; 29%
Explain the trial process to jurors before trial n = 87; 68%
Encourage attorneys to change trial strategy n = 11; 8.6%
Encourage attorneys to alter evidentiary presentation n = 16; 13%
Require attorneys to alter evidentiary presentation n = 2; 1.6%
Refuse to allow certain evidence n = 21; 16%
Instruct witnesses to modify their testimony n = 0; 0%
Instruct witnesses to clarify their testimony n = 14; 11%
Permit jurors to take notes during trial n = 67; 52%
Permit jurors to ask questions during trial n = 30; 23%
Permit jurors to discuss case among themselves during trial n = 14; 11%
Alter typical order of trial n = 16; 13%
Limit delay n = 73; 57%
Shorten length of court days for jurors n = 43; 37%
Provide additional breaks for jurors n = 71; 56%
Ask jurors their wishes about lunchtime, quitting time, etc. n = 75; 59%
Encourage attorneys to make motions when jurors not present n = 36; 28%
Require attorneys to make motions when jurors not present n = 46; 36%
Personally address stress with jurors during trial n = 12; 9%
Discourage side bar conferences n = 15; 12%
Provide special seating for jurors n = 20; 16%
Control public access to court room n = 12; 9%
Empty court room n = 3; 2.3%
Shield jurors from media n = 30; 23%
As judge, attempt to maintain positive rapport with jurors n = 83; 65%
Instruct court officials to be sensitive to juror needs n = 83; 65%
Designate court official to monitor jurors during trial n = 52; 41%
Designate court official to discuss stress with jurors during trial n = 3; 2.3%
Explain jury instructions clearly n = 73; 57%
Provide special amenities in jury room n = 45; 35%
Accept hung jury sooner than usual n = 3; 2.3%
Contact family member to ascertain juror’s well-being n = 6; 4.7%
Permit family contacts during sequestration n = 6; 4.7%
Make available posttrial debriefing by a court official n = 10; 7.8%
Make available posttrial debriefing by a judge n = 48; 38%
Make available posttrial debriefing by a mental-health expert n = 6; 4.7%
Refer jurors to available mental-health counseling n = 7; 5.5%
Offer to pay for mental-health counseling n = 2; 1.6%
Others (please specify) n = 7; 5.5%
Note: Numbers in bold indicate frequency over 50%.
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based on gender or experiencing a work-related stress/safety
incident. Although judges utilized an average of nearly 10 dif-
ferent strategies to reduce jurors stress (M = 9.71; Mdn = 12; SD
= 7.13), independent-sample t-tests revealed no significant dif-
ferences based on these two variables (all ps > .39).
Judge Stress
The second research question focused on judges’ own
experiences with stress. Judges were asked about general and
occupational stress, the effects of stress on work performance,
specific stressful situations, and physical and emotional mani-
festations of stress. Respondents also completed clinical scales
designed to measure PTSD, depression, and anxiety. In addi-
tion, analyses were conducted to determine whether individ-
ual differences affected stress levels, as stated in Research
Question 5.
General Stress. Judges indicated the amount of stress they
had experienced over the past year on a seven-point scale (1 =
no stress; 7 = extreme stress). In general, judges indicated that
they had experienced a moderate amount of stress (M = 4.29,
Mdn = 4.0, SD = 1.31). Analysis revealed a gender difference in
the reporting of general stress (t (151) = -3.66; p = .00).
Specifically, women reported experiencing higher levels of
stress (M = 4.75; SD = 1.20) than men (M = 3.99; SD = 1.29).
Experiencing a work-related stressful incident was also related
to general stress (t (152) = 2.76; p = .01). Not surprisingly,
judges who experienced a work-related stress/safety incident
were significantly more likely to experience general stress (M
= 4.63; SD = 1.28) than those who did not experience such an
event (M = 4.04; SD = 1.29). 
Trial Stress. Judges were also asked to indicate the amount
of stress they experienced during a typical trial on a seven-
point scale (1 = no stress; 7 = extreme stress). Similar to results
regarding general stress, judges reported experiencing a mod-
erate amount of stress during a typical trial (M = 3.83, Mdn =
4.0, SD = 1.21). 
A marginally significant gender effect was found on reports
of trial stress (t(145) = -1.78, p = .08). Consistent with trends
in reports of general stress, women (M = 4.06; SD = 1.2)
reported higher levels of stress than males (M = 3.09; SD =
1.21). Experiencing a work-related stress/safety incident was
not related to trial-related stress (p = .23).
Symptoms of Stress. Judges were asked to indicate how
their stress had manifested itself by checking items on a list.
Items included on the list were:  “anxiety,” “sleep distur-
bances,” “nervousness,” “irritability,” “other emotional symp-
toms,” and “other.” Judges who checked “other” were also
asked to specify the emotional form that stress had taken. Of
the judges, 99 (61% of the total sample) reported feeling irri-
table, 79 judges (48%) reported anxiety, 72 judges (44%)
reported sleep disturbances, and 24 judges (15%) reported ner-
vousness. A total of 31 judges (19%) indicated that they expe-
rienced other emotional forms of stress, the most common of
which were eating problems, depression, and anger.
Differences in emotional stress based on gender and experi-
encing a work-related stress/safety incident were examined by
combining all reported emotional forms of stress (from the
list) into one numerical value ranging from zero to six.
Descriptive statistics revealed that judges typically reported
more than one emotional manifestation of stress (M = 1.86;
Mdn = 2; SD = 1.21). Independent-sample t-tests revealed no
significant difference in reported emotional stress between
males and females (p = .52). Judges who had experienced a
stress/safety incident (M = 2.17; SD = 1.14) were more likely to
report emotional manifestations of stress than judges who had
not (M = 1.71; SD = 1.2; t(159) = 2.44, p = .02). 
Similar to emotional symptoms of stress, judges were asked
to indicate which physical forms of stress they had experi-
enced. The list compiled by the authors included “headaches,”
“muscle tension,” and “other.” Judges who checked “other”
were also asked to specify the physical form that stress had
taken. Of the judges, 89 (55% of all judges in the sample) indi-
cated that they had experienced muscle tension, 43 judges
(26%) indicated that they had experienced headaches, and 55
judges (34%) indicated they had experienced some other form
of physical stress. Of the judges who indicated that they suf-
fered other physical forms of stress, 13 reported feeling
exhausted or fatigued, 9 reported eating problems, 7 reported
stomach problems, and 5 reported back, chest, or muscle pain.
Other reported physical manifestations of stress included shin-
gles, hypertension, rashes, and diabetes.  
Differences in physical manifestations of stress based on
gender and experience with a work-related stress/safety inci-
dent were examined by combining all reported physical forms
of stress (from the list) into one numerical value ranging from
0 to 3. Descriptive statistics revealed that judges typically expe-
rience one physical manifestation of stress (M = 1.14; Mdn = 1;
SD = .83). Independent-sample t-tests revealed no significant
differences based on gender or on experiencing a work-related
stress/safety incident (all ps > 1.29). 
Judges’ Daily Experiences. Respondents were given seven
statements from Foa, Cashman, Jaycox, and Perry’s Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder diagnostic scale53 to rate on a five-
point scale (1 = not at all; 5 = extremely) indicating how
descriptive each symptom was of their daily experiences as a
judge. On average, “feeling distant or cut off” and “feeling irri-
table or angry” were most descriptive of judges’ daily experi-
ences (see Table 2 for a full summary).  
TABLE 2: JUDGES EXPERIENCES WITH STRESS SYPMTOMS
Statement M, Mdn, SD
Having upsetting thoughts or images about the trial 1.56; 1.00; .79
Feeling distant or cut off from people around you 2.29; 2.00; 1.09
Feeling emotionally numb 1.64; 1.00; .90
Feeling irritable or having fits or anger 2.15; 2.00; .95
Having trouble concentrating 1.87; 2.00; .87
Being overly alert 1.68; 1.00; .97
Being jumpy or easily startled 1.57; 1.00; .93
Note: (1 = not at all; 5 = extremely)
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Numerical responses were combined from each of the seven
statements to create a measure of PTSD-type symptoms with
scores ranging from 7 to 35. On average, judges exhibited
moderately low scores on this measure of stress (M = 12.74;
Mdn = 12; SD = 4.56). Differences in stress scores based on
gender and experience were examined through independent-
sample t-tests. Consistent with the self reported measure of
general stress, females were more likely to experience these
symptoms of stress (M = 13.79; SD = 5.05) than males (M =
11.97; SD = 3.96; t(136) = -2.36, p = .02). Analysis also
revealed that judges who had experienced a work related
stress/safety incident (M = 13.98; SD = 5.17) were more likely
to report higher levels of stress than judges who had not (M =
11.81; SD = 3.88; t(100) = 2.70; p = .01). 
Depression and anxiety. Respondents also completed two
clinical measures which assessed depression and anxiety. The
first was the Center for Epidemiology Studies Depression Scale
(CESDS), a 20-item self-report scale intended to measure
depressive symptoms in community populations.54 Items
emphasize affect (e.g., feelings of depressed mood, guilt, hope-
lessness) and psychomotor impairment (e.g., loss of appetite,
sleep disturbances) and require respondents to report how
often they experienced each symptom in the previous week on
a four-point scale (0 = rarely or none of the time; 3 = most or
all of the time). Scores range from 0 to 60, and the average of
the general population is approximately 8.7.55 Twenty percent
of the general population falls above a score 16, which has
often been used as a cutoff suggesting depressive impair-
ment.56
Overall, judges’ average score on the CESDS was 15.52 (SD
= 5.72, Mdn = 14). This number exceeds the mean score in the
general population and also falls close to one generally utilized
cutoff score of 16. Significant gender differences were found
with respect to scores on the CESDS. Females’ scores exceeded
the impairment cutoff score of 16 and were significantly higher
(M = 17.69; SD = 6.28) than those of male respondents (M =
14.01; SD = 4.62; t(121) = 3.71; p < .001), whose scores fell
below the cutoff. Additionally, those judges who had previ-
ously experienced a work related stress/safety incident also
scored above the impairment cutoff of 16 (M = 17.41; SD =
6.05), scoring significantly higher than those lacking such an
experience (M = 14.26; SD = 5.15; t(122) = 3.12; p < .003).
Participants also completed a shortened 6-item form of the
Spielberger State Anxiety Inventory57 developed by Chlan and
colleagues.58 Spielberger’s STAI has been widely utilized as a
measure of both enduring (trait) and changing (state).59 The
brief form employed in the current study targets trait anxiety
and has been demonstrated to be highly correlated (0.92) with
the full 20-item version, with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.78.60
Participants responded on 4-point scales in the 6-item version,
with possible cumulative scores ranging from 4 to 24.  The
average score of judges was 18.56 (SD = 4.20, Mdn = 19),
falling in the moderately high end of the range of possible
scores. Analyses did not reveal a significant gender difference
on participant scores on the shortened STAI (p > .22). There
was, however, a significant difference with regards to previous
experience with a work related stress/safety incident. Judges
who had experienced such an incident scored significantly
higher on the brief STAI (M = 12.55; SD = 4.23) than those
who had not (M = 10.71; SD = 4.04; t(132) = 2.54; p < .02).
Effects of Stress. Judges were asked to indicate the degree to
which their ability to fulfill responsibilities had been compro-
mised by high levels of stress on a seven-point scale (1 = not
compromised; 7 = very compromised). In general, judges indi-
cated that their ability to fulfill responsibilities had been only
slightly compromised by stress (M = 2.23; Mdn = 2.0; SD =
1.52). However, a total of 27 judges (17% of the total sample)
indicated that their responsibilities had been at least moder-
ately compromised (rating of 4 or higher) due to high levels of
stress. 
Independent-sample t-tests were used to determine if there
were any differences in the reporting of compromised respon-
sibilities based on gender and/or experience with a work
related stress/safety incident. Females (M = 2.80; SD = 1.18)
reported that their responsibilities had been significantly more
compromised by stress than males (M = 2.80; SD = 1.18; t(81)
= -3.37, p < .01). However, experiencing a work related stress-
ful incident had no statistically significant effect on the report-
ing of compromised responsibilities (p = .11). 
Judges were also asked an open ended question about how
their functions were specifically compromised. Judges com-
monly reported a decrease in productivity resulting from stress
and heavy workloads (n = 26). Many of these judges reported
a decrease in efficiency stemming from procrastination, avoid-
ance of workplace duties, loss of energy, and fatigue. Twenty-
one judges also reported that stress had compromised their
ability to maintain appropriate courtroom demeanor.
Specifically, judges indicated that they had become irritable,
angry, and impatient with courtroom actors, especially
lawyers. Thirteen judges indicated stress had compromised
their ability to concentrate in the workplace, suggesting that
case outcomes may have been compromised because judges
were distracted or unable to focus. A total of eight judges
explicitly stated that stress had compromised decisions that
had been made. One judge explained that stress had led to
“sloppy decision making,” and several other judges indicated
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that they were not able to remain impartial when deciding
cases. 
Stressful Situations. Judges were asked to rate the level of
stress they experienced stemming from several scenarios on a
five-point scale (1 = not at all; 5 = extremely). The highest lev-
els of reported stress stemmed from crimes against children (M
= 3.0), sexual crimes (M = 2.85), and violent crimes (M =
2.74). Sixty-six percent of judges reported that crimes against
children were at least moderately stressful, 61% of judges
reported that sexual crimes were at least moderately stressful,
and 57% of judges reported that violent crimes were are least
moderately stressful. 
Judges reported that media coverage during a trial was
somewhat stressful (M = 2.15), and 37% believed that is was at
least moderately stressful. Judges also reported that they were
a little stressed (on average) over public identification (M =
2.0) and, more generally, safety concerns (M = 2.2). Twenty-
three percent of judges reported that they were at least moder-
ately stressed about being publicly identified, while 33% per-
cent of judges experienced stress stemming from safety con-
cerns. Characteristics of the parties, victims, and court officials
were all somewhat stressful for judges on average (M = 2.07,
2.05, and 2.15, respectively). Thirty-three percent of judges
reported at least moderate amounts of stress from characteris-
tics of the parties, 29% of judges were at least moderately
stressed from characteristics of the victims, and 33% of judges
were at least moderately stressed from characteristics of court
officials. 
Factors specifically related to trial were also significant
sources of stress for judges. Long trials, boring trials, and trial
interruptions were all reported (on average) to be at least some-
what stressful (M = 2.38, 2.40, and 2.71, respectively). Forty-
four percent of judges reported at least marginal stress from
long trials, and many judges reported at least moderate stress
stemming from boring trials (41%), and trial interruptions
(53%). A summary of the means and percentages of stressful
situations experienced by judges is provided in Table 3.
Numerical responses were combined from each of the 41
situations provided by the researchers in the instrument to cre-
ate another measure of stress with scores ranging from 41 to
205. On average, judges scored 77.85 on this stress scale (Mdn
= 75; SD = 19.53), indicating only a mild to moderate stress as
a result of these situations. Analysis revealed a marginal effect
for gender in the expected direction (t(59) = -1.76, p = .08).
Consistent with the other measures of stress in the survey,
females were (marginally) more likely to experience stress (M
= 85.93; SD = 20.08) than males (M = 75.46; SD = 19.32) as a
result of these situations. There was no statistically significant
effect found for experience with a work-related stress/safety
situation on this measure (p = .17).
Judges were asked to report additional stressful situations
that were not on the list of potential stressful situations. Heavy
workload (n = 20) was the most commonly mentioned source
of stress among judges. Similarly, judges reported that lack of
time, resources, and staff led to stress (n = 15). Other sources
of stress included the attitudes and behavior of parties (n =
19), the nature of the political process (n = 9), tension among
colleagues and staff (n = 4), pressures related to campaigning
for election (n = 3), and balancing family and work (n = 3).





Jury selection (i.e., voir dire) 1.72; 18%
Pre-existing medical or psychological problems 1.43; 9%
Troubles at home 1.96; 24%
Media coverage of the trial 2.15; 37%
Cameras in the courtroom 1.78; 10%
Being publicly identified as a judge 1.96; 23%
Fear of reprisal/concerns for personal safety 2.20; 33%
Characteristics of the criminal defendant 1.74; 17%
Characteristics of the parties 2.07; 34%
Characteristics of the victims 2.05; 30%
Interactions with court officials (e.g., rude behavior) 2.15; 34%
Crimes against children 3.00; 67%
Sexual crimes 2.85; 61%
Violent crimes 2.74; 58%
Issues/Evidence with a personal impact/meaning 2.19; 41%
Disturbing/Grisly evidence 2.33; 37%
Complex or technical evidence 2.17; 31%
Expert testimony 1.79; 17%
Long trials 2.38; 44%
Boring trials 2.40; 41%
Trial interruptions/delays 2.71; 54%
Side bars/Discussions outside hearing of jurors 1.63; 15%
Attorneys’ behavior during trial 2.74; 56%
Objections/Arguments by attorneys 1.96; 24%
The adversarial system 1.71; 17%
Instructions to disregard evidence/testimony 1.38; 5%
Explaining jury instructions 1.33; 8%
Deciding which jury instructions to give 1.76; 19%
Jury deliberations (e.g. waiting, fear of arguments) 1.26; 1%
Fear of making a mistake in giving instructions 1.64; 13%
Fear of making a mistake in deciding motions 2.04; 24%
Dissension/Differences among jurors 1.31; 3%
Hung jury 1.46; 12%
Sentencing a criminal defendant 2.08; 32%
Determinations regarding jurors’ decisions about death penalty 1.60; 20%
Concerns about community reactions to verdict 1.82; 18%
Photographs or videos presented as evidence 1.77; 21%
Verbal testimony presented as evidence 1.52; 10%
Your feelings for the victim (or plaintiff) and the victim’s family 1.92; 21%
Your feelings for the defendant and the defendant’s family 1.82; 15%
Fear of making a mistake and reaching the wrong verdict 2.28; 33%
Note: “Mean percentage” indicates the percentage of judges who indicated
that they experienced at least moderate amounts of stress from the situation
(1 = Not at all; 5 = extremely).
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Suggestions for reducing the stress of judges. Respondents
were also asked an open-ended question requesting that they
provide coping strategies that judges could use to reduce stress
(see Table 4). 
Of the 91 total suggestions, exercise and time off/sabbaticals
were the most commonly suggested means of addressing judi-
cial stress (n = 15). Interaction with professional colleagues
(e.g., through mentoring, support groups, and collaboration)
and involvement with nonoccupational social networks (e.g.,
family, friends) were both also among the more commonly sug-
gested strategies (n = 12 and 11, respectively). Increased court
house security (10) and stress-management training (10) were
also advocated by respondents.
Safety Concerns
To address Research Question 3, concerning judges’ percep-
tions of safety and what measures they take to protect them-
selves, respondents were asked a variety of questions regarding
safety issues. These items related to perceptions of safety,
sources of safety concern, and experiences with safety-related
incidents. Individual differences, including gender and experi-
ence with a work-related stress/safety incident, were also
assessed to address Research Question 5.
Personal Safety. Judges specified their level of concern for
their personal safety on a seven-point Likert-type scale (1 = no
concerns; 7 = extremely concerned). Overall, judges exhibited
moderate amounts of concern for personal safety (M = 2.80; SD
= 1.41; Mdn = 2.00). Further analyses revealed significant gen-
der differences with regards to personal-safety concerns, with
females (M = 3.20; SD = 1.19) reporting greater levels of con-
cern than their male counterparts (M = 2.51; SD = 1.53; t(141)
= 3.00, p < .01). Additionally, those judges who had previously
experienced a work-related stress/safety incident also
expressed greater concern for personal safety (M = 3.15; SD =
1.56) than those lacking such an experience (M = 2.55; SD =
1.24; t(142) = 2.51; p < .02).
Safety of One’s Family. Respondents also specified their
individual levels of concern with respect to the safety of their
family on a similar seven-point scale. Taken together, judges
expressed moderate amounts of concern for family safety (M =
3.11; SD = 1.61; Mdn = 3.00). A two-tailed paired-sample t-test
revealed that concern for family was significantly greater that
concern for personal safety (t(144) = 3.94, p < .001). Analyses
revealed no significant gender differences (p > .10); however,
judges who had previously experienced a work-related
stress/safety incident, exhibited greater concern for family
safety (M = 3.48; SD = 1.80) than judges who had not (M =
2.85; SD = 1.40; t(141) = 2.32; p < .03).
Specific Safety Concerns. Judges were also asked to rate
their concern for 19 different work-related safety threats on
five-point scales (1 = not at all to 5 = extremely). Results are
displayed in Table 5. 
The specific threats judges were most concerned about were
being inappropriately approached (M = 2.46; SD = .99), being
confronted face-to-face (M = 2.26; SD = .99), receiving threat-
ening letters (M = 2.13; SD = .99) or phone calls (M = 2.10; SD
= 1.03), being followed (M = 2.06; SD = 1.05), and being phys-
ically assaulted (M = 2.06; SD = .99). Alternatively, respon-
dents were least concerned about being seriously injured by
court personnel (M = 1.13; SD = .18) and anthrax in the cour-
thouse (M = 1.35; SD = .71).
TABLE 4: SUGGESTIONS FOR REDUCING STRESS
Strategy # % (of total)
Exercise 15 13.19
Time off/sabbatical 12 12.09
Interaction with professional colleagues 11 10.99
Social interaction (outside of work) 10 10.99
Increase courthouse security 10 10.99
Stress-management training 10 7.69
Balance in life 7 6.59
Reduce workloads 6 4.40
Prayer/Religion 4 2.20
Greater psychological awareness 2 2.20
Time management 2 2.20
More resources (staff, technology) 2 2.20
TOTAL 91 100
TABLE 5: RATINGS OF CONCERN 
FOR SPECIFIC SAFETY-RELATED THREATS
Specific Threat M, Mdn, SD
Inappropriate letters 1.74; 2.00;  .68
Inappropriate phone calls 1.83; 2.00;  .68
Inappropriate faxes 1.59; 1.00;  .75
Threatening letters 2.13; 2.00; .99
Threatening phone calls 2.10; 2.00;  1.03
Threatening faxes 1.90; 2.00;  1.03
Receiving a bomb or anthrax in the mail 1.52; 1.00;  .89
Being inappropriately approached 2.46; 2.00;  .97
Being followed 2.06; 2.00;  1.05
Being confronted face-to-face 2.26; 2.00;  .99
Being physically assaulted 2.06; 2.00;  .95
Being seriously injured by a defendant 1.85; 2.00;  .95
Being seriously injured by a defendant’s family 1.82; 2.00;  .93
Being seriously injured by court personnel 1.13; 1.00;  .18
Being seriously injured by random person in the courtroom 1.60; 1.00;  .74
Having a gun pulled on you 1.88; 2.00;  .95
Having a knife pulled on you 1.82; 2.00;  .90
Bomb threats in the courthouse 1.74; 2.00;  .98
Anthrax in the courthouse 1.35; 1.00;  .71
Note: (1 = not at all; 5 = extremely)   
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Only one gender difference emerged in these analyses.
Female respondents (M = 2.35; SD = 1.07) were significantly
more concerned about being followed than males (M = 1.83;
SD = .91; t(141) = 3.07; p < .01). Additionally, those judges
who had previous experience with a safety/stress incident at
work rated being significantly more concerned with receiving
inappropriate letters (M = 1.92; SD = .91) than their counter-
parts who had never experienced such an event (M = 1.65; SD
= .59; t(141) = 2.32; p < .04).
Experiences with Safety Incidents. Judges reporting that
they had previously experienced a threatening event were
asked to specify what types of threats they had encountered. A
total of 26 different types of events were reported (see Table 6). 
Inappropriate or threatening letters were the most common
(55, 33.5%), followed by inappropriate or threatening phone
calls (27, 16.5%), and death or bomb threats (13, 7.9%, each).
Face-to-face confrontations involving either a litigant or a rela-
tive of a litigant (12, 7.3%), verbal threats in court (9, 5.5%),
and being inappropriately approached (8, 4.9%) were also
among the more frequently reported incidents reported by
respondents. 
Precautionary Measures. Judges were asked what measures
they had taken to address their safety concerns by checking
items from a checklist of 14 possible measures. Seventy percent
of judges indicated they had taken at least one precautionary
measure and nearly one-third (31.9%) specified taking over
three. Respondents listed a total of 336 precautionary mea-
sures (see Table 7). 
The most frequently reported response was the purchase of
a cellphone (65, 17.6% of total), followed by adding to exist-
ing courtroom security (54, 14.6%), increasing security at per-
sonal residence (49, 13.2%), buying cellphones for family
members (46, 12.4%), and purchasing a firearm (36, 9.7%).
The number of precautionary measures taken (e.g., installing
safety alarms in home, buying a gun) was positively associated
with stress experienced during a trial (r = .18, p < .05), con-
cerns about personal safety (r = .38, p < .01), and safety of fam-
ily (r = .36, p <.01). Overall, judges adopted an average of 2.07
TABLE 6: EXPERIENCES WITH 
THREATENING SITUATIONS/EVENTS
Incident # % (of total)
Inappropriate/Threatening letters 55 25.82
Inappropriate/Threatening calls 27 12.68
Death threats 19 8.92
Bomb threats 13 6.10
Face-to-face confrontation (with litigant or 
family member)
13 6.10
Verbal threats in court 12 5.63
Inappropriately approached 11 5.16
Threats to home or family 10 4.69
Physically attacked in court 10 4.69
False accusations 10 4.69
Other incident 7 3.29
Weapons seized at courthouse/in courtroom 6 2.82
Had a gun pointed at 4 1.88
Target of pranks 4 1.88
Anthrax threats 2 0.94
Threats against staff members 1 0.47
Physically assaulted outside of courthouse 1 0.47
Fellow judge shot 1 0.47
Personal residence attacked (arson) 1 0.47
Threat requiring personal police escort 1 0.47
Escape attempt by defendant in court 1 0.47
Followed outside of courthouse 1 0.47
Public postings discouraging reelection 1 0.47
Tires slashed 1 0.47
Witness attacked in court 1 0.47
TOTAL 213 100
TABLE 7: PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES TAKEN TO
ADDRESS SAFETY CONCERNS
Safety Precaution # % (of total)
Purchased a cellphone 65 18.84
Added more security in the courtroom 54 15.65
Increased home security (e.g., alarms, motion 
sensitive lighting, etc.)
49 13.24
Purchased cellphones for family 46 13.33
Purchased a firearm 36 10.43
Varied schedule 28 8.12
Bought mace/pepper spray 11 3.19
Stopped working late hours 10 2.90
Changed locks at personal residence 10 2.90
Purchased a guard dog 10 2.90
Enrolled in self-defense classes 7 2.03
Take additional measures to protect family 
(e.g., create emergency plans)
6 1.73
Enlisted security detail/police escort 4 1.16
Increased general awareness of personal 
surroundings
4 1.16
Changed travel route 2 0.57
Wore bulletproof vest 1 0.28
Changed personal phone number 1 0.28
Other 1 0.28
TOTAL 336 100
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safety precautions (SD = 1.91, Mdn = 2.00). There were no sig-
nificant differences between individuals who had experienced
a work-related stress/safety incident and those who had not, or
between male and female judges (all ps > .4)
Relationship between Stress and Safety 
Research Question 4 focused on the potential relationship
between judges’ perceptions of safety and their experiences of
stress. Analyses revealed significant positive associations
between ratings of general experiences of stress and concerns
about one’s own personal safety (r = 0.36, p < .01) and safety
of family (r = 0.29, p < .01). A similar positive relationship was
found between stress experienced during a trial and concerns
about personal (r = .24, p < .01) and family (r = .27, p < .01)
safety. The number of physical and emotional symptoms of
stress was positively correlated with both concern of personal
(r = 0.22, p <.05) and family (r = 0.27. p < .01) safety.  Scores
on the CESD were also positively associated with personal- and
family-safety concerns (r = 0.371, p <. 001; r = .302; p < .001,
respectively).  Conversely, scores on the STAI short form were
negatively correlated with safety concerns (personal: r = -
0.357, p < .001; family: r = -0.312, p < .001).
Concern for personal safety was positively correlated with
ratings on each of the PTSD symptom measures.  These items,
on which respondents reported the extent to which a variety of
negative psychological experiences were judged to be “descrip-
tive of daily experience as a judge,” included:  having upsetting
thoughts/images (r = 0.20, p < .05), feeling distant or cut off (r
= 0.26, p < .01), feeling emotionally numb (r = 0.21, p < .01),
feeling irritable (r = 0.27, p < .01), experiencing difficulties
concentrating (r = 0.23, p < .01), being overly alert (r = 0.60, p
< .01), and being jumpy or easily startled (r = 0.54, p < .01).
Likewise, concerns about the safety of one’s family were also
positively correlated to a variety of these experiences, includ-
ing: feeling distant or cut off (r = 0.23, p < .01), feeling irrita-
ble (r = 0.20, p < .05), having difficulties concentrating (r =
0.23, p < .01), being overly alert (r = 0.60, p < .01), and being
jumpy or easily startled (r = 0.54, p < .01).
DISCUSSION
The overarching purpose of the current exploratory study
was to add to the relative paucity of research related to the
judicial perspective on stress and safety by addressing five
major research questions. Research Question 1 concerned
judges’ perceptions of jury stress and what measures they have
taken to protect jurors. Analyses revealed judges believe that it
is their responsibility to protect jurors from stress, and they
often take steps to reduce stress among jurors. Judges’ beliefs
about the court’s responsibility to address juror stress, as well
as the frequency of strategies used for reducing such stress,
were unaffected by either gender or experience with a work-
related stress/safety event. In general, judges used a variety of
different strategies to reduce juror stress. The most commonly
employed measures paralleled previous research by the
NCSC61 suggesting the protection of jurors from potential
stress is accepted among judges as a requisite occupational
duty. Regardless of gender or experience with a work-related
stress/safety incident, the belief that jurors should be pro-
tected, and the propensity to protect jurors, is strong among
members of the judiciary surveyed. 
Research Question 2 shifted the focus to the stress experi-
enced by judges, what aspects of their occupational duties
were most stressful, and how they sought to cope with stress.
Results provide support for the notion that members of the
judiciary are susceptible to occupational stress. Moreover, the
study allowed for the more detailed examination of the nature
of stress experienced by judges by integrating numerous
dependant measures not utilized in previous research. Three
separate measures of stress provide a relatively stable pattern of
reporting in which judges reported experiencing moderate lev-
els of stress, both in general and during the course of a given
trial. Judges also reported several emotional and physical 
manifestations of stress, the most prevalent of which were irri-
tability, anxiety, sleep disturbances, muscle tension, and anger.
Importantly, several judges believed that occupational stress
resulted in more serious emotional and physical maladies,
such as eating problems, depression, hypertension, and dia-
betes. Scores on the CESDS also indicated potential depressive
impairment in the responding judges as their scores were
almost double that of the average of the general population.
Stress did not, however, appear to greatly impact judges’ self-
reports of their abilities to perform their occupational duties.
The current study also revealed the specific sources of stress
for judges. The highest levels of stress for judges stemmed
from experiencing cases involving crimes against children,
sexual crimes, and violent crimes. Fear over public identifica-
tion, characteristics of the parties, and safety concerns were all
moderately stressful. Judges also reported stress stemming
from long and boring trials, trial interruptions, heavy work-
load, the nature of the political process, and tension among
colleagues and staff.
In light of the increasing frequency of accounts of violence
at the courthouse and against members of the judiciary,
Research Question 3 addressed how judges felt about their per-
sonal safety and what protective measures they had adopted in
response to safety concerns. Although nearly three in five
respondents (58.9%) indicated previous experience with a
work-related threatening situation/event (see Table 6), in gen-
eral, judges did not report being excessively concerned with
safety. They did express greater fear for family safety than per-
sonal safety (M = 3.11 and M = 2.80 respectively, rated on
seven-point scales), though these ratings suggested only mod-
est levels of concern. In addition, judges did not report being
deeply concerned with any of the 19 specific threats listed in
the survey. Even the individual threats with the highest ratings
did not average above 2.5 (the scale midpoint).
The most frequent safety-related incidents experienced by
respondents were threatening letters and phone calls,62 though
more serious threats—such as death threats and face-to-face
confrontations—were also among the more frequently
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reported incidents. The most common precautionary measures
taken in response to safety concerns were the purchase of a
cellphone, increasing security (both at the courthouse and at
one’s personal residence), and the purchase of a firearm. Over
half (54.6%) of all respondents reported adopting multiple pre-
cautionary measures in response to safety issues.
Our fourth research question bridged two of the aforemen-
tioned points of interest by exploring the relationship between
judges’ perceptions of safety and their experiences of stress.
Analyses revealed a generally consistent relationship between
safety concerns and measures of stress. Concern for personal
and family safety were, for example, positively associated with
general stress and stress experienced during the course of a
trial, deleterious physical and emotional symptoms, and
numerous negative psychological experiences (e.g., irritability,
difficulty concentrating) characterized as being descriptive of
daily experience as a judge.
The fifth and final research question focused on individual
differences in judges’ experiences of stress and perceptions of
safety in relation to gender and experience of a stress/safety-
related work incident. In many respects, female judges
reported experiencing greater stress and being more concerned
with safety issues than their male counterparts. For example,
based on several measures of stress, females were consistently
more likely to report experiencing general and trial-related
stress. In addition, female judges were more likely to report
that their responsibilities had been compromised by stress than
were male judges. This trend parallels findings from previous
judicial stress research, such as that of Jaffe and colleagues,63
which found that females exhibited more symptoms of vicari-
ous trauma than males. Females also reported greater levels of
concern for personal safety, a finding of considerable interest. 
In addition, judges who had previously experienced a work-
related stress/safety incident, such as a threatening or violent
act, also consistently reported greater stress and concerns for
personal safety on virtually all measures. There were no differ-
ences, however, among judges of different types (e.g., criminal
vs. civil judges) on any variable. This indicates that all judges
in this exploratory study, without regard to their specific duties
(e.g., criminal or civil court) experience stress and safety needs
similarly.
Several caveats warrant consideration in the current study.
The first relates to socially desirable responding. Various
design features of the study attempted to encourage unbiased
and accurate responses. For example, the amount of personal
information asked of the judges was intentionally limited to
reduce the possibility that there would be a concern that
answers could later be connected to the individual. Moreover,
internet surveys have been suggested to have some advantages
in eliciting more honest responses in comparison to other
methods, such as face-to-face interviews.64
Nevertheless, it is possible that the respondents’ answers
were susceptible to social desirability. For example, the self-
report measure of compromised responsibilities resulting from
experiences of stress may have been flawed in that judges were
likely to under-report the negative impact of stress on their
responsibilities. This is plausible given that:  (1) judges may
not fully recognize the negative impact of stress; and (2)
reporting such vulnerability is not socially desirable because
such an admission would have negative implications for their
personal legal decisions as well as for the integrity of the legal
system. This idea seems to gain credibility when considering
judges’ specific explanations about how their responsibilities
had been compromised. A number of judges reported that
stress led to decreased productivity, inappropriate courtroom
demeanor, decreased concentration, and compromised court-
room decisions. These explanations do not seem to correspond
with the overall low scores seen in the close-ended self-report
measures. Thus, when asked directly about the negative effects
of stress, judges were apprehensive to report, but when given
the opportunity to explain in open-ended fashion, it did
appear that judges’ were able to list specific ways in which
their responsibilities were seriously compromised by stress.
In addition, it is also possible that socially desirable
responding may have factored into ratings of safety concerns.
That is, respondents may have been less inclined to acknowl-
edge concern about certain threats and safety issues, for exam-
ple, because such a concession may be perceived as communi-
cating the effectiveness of threats they encounter, which could
encourage future acts. While responses did not indicate high
levels of fear, a substantial proportion of judges (70.56%)
reported having adopting at least one precautionary measure to
address perceived safety issues, suggesting concern was suffi-
cient to motivate reactions among those surveyed.
It should also be noted that the respondents to the survey
represented a convenience sample, recruited by their affiliation
with either the NCJFCJ, or the University’s Judicial Studies
program. This sample may not necessarily be representative of
the general population of judges and their experiences of stress
or perceptions of safety. Future research should build upon the
current work by employing a systematic, nationwide sampling
plan.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The judicial system in our society is grounded on an
assumption that both judges and jurors can function effec-
tively under sometimes severely trying circumstances. Recent
research on juror stress has revealed that there are significant
impediments to juror functioning under some circumstances.
The limited research on judicial stress, including that reported
herein, suggests that problems of stress effects are shared by
judges as well. 
There are a number of conclusions and recommendations
that flow from this exploratory study, not the least of which is
that much more research is needed in this area, which has
received little attention from researchers dealing with occupa-
tional stress or those focusing on the functioning of judges
within the judicial system. Future research can be guided
somewhat by our tentative findings derived from the five
research questions we addressed.
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Concerning judges’ feelings of responsibility toward jurors,
judges commonly take small steps, such as being sensitive to
juror needs and explaining trial procedures. However, more
formal procedures (e.g., debriefings) may also be needed.65
Such interventions could not only help jurors directly, but
might also help judges, who will experience less stress because
they are able to better fulfill their occupational duty of pro-
tecting jurors.
The issue of stress felt by judges was also examined, reveal-
ing a number of stressors and effects, although most judges
claimed that these did not affect their functioning as judges.
Nevertheless, high amounts of depression or anxiety can affect
personal and work life, suggesting that interventions may be
needed. A workplace-wide attitude change should take place
in courthouses, making therapeutic measures, such as time off
or professional help, acceptable for judges.66
While interventions have been employed to address juror
stress, judges have largely been ignored, though they may bene-
fit from similar measures. For example, posttrial debriefings fol-
lowing difficult trials may also be necessary for judges. In addi-
tion, court administrators should be aware of other occupational
stressors, such as heavy workload and tension among col-
leagues, in order to develop policies to relieve any ill effects.
These are likely very specific to each court (e.g., each court has
specific problems), but the finding that so many judges reported
general problems in this domain suggests that courts should
consider procedural changes to reduce these stressors.
Judges’ concerns about personal safety and precautionary
measures taken revealed an interesting pattern. The ratings of
concern found were in some ways contradictory to the some-
what high prevalence of measures respondents reported adopt-
ing in response to safety threats, suggesting judges may have
been hesitant to openly disclose personal concern about safety
issues. Harris et al.67 discovered a similar phenomenon, find-
ing that even though judges reported altering both personal
and occupational behaviors after experiencing a safety-related
event, many claimed not to have been affected by the threat of
violence.  This issue needs more study to discern if these find-
ings represent reality, or if judges are simply not reporting
accurately.
On the question of the relationship of perceptions of safety
and stress, our results revealed considerable reason for con-
cern. These results reinforce assertions regarding the impor-
tance of safety-related issues for the judiciary and the need to
address these concerns68 so that the functioning of the judicial
system is not negatively impacted.
The findings suggesting that women are either more sus-
ceptible to stress or are more open about reporting stress and
safety concerns demand more study. If females are more
affected by safety concerns and stress, then intervention efforts
may benefit female judges by incorporating specific measures
tailored to the needs of female judges into the design of the
intervention. Alternatively, if these differences are the product
of a self-report bias, male judges should be encouraged to more
openly acknowledge their experiences of stress and seek help
without fear of stigmatization since their female counterparts
are already more likely to do so. This underscores the impor-
tance of a general attitudinal change discussed by Miller and
colleagues,69 in which the judicial system would come to sup-
port stress interventions as a necessary and important part of
the trial process.
These results from our exploratory research suggest that
any stress or safety interventions should equally focus on the
protection and well-being of all judges. The results should con-
tribute to a broader understanding of the nature of judicial
stress, providing insight to into individual differences associ-
ated with both experiences of stress and safety concerns. Our
research focus emphasizes how maintaining a safe and secure
environment is important not only for judges, but ultimately
also for the proper functioning of the American trial system.
We hope that the work reported herein will encourage others
to pursue research in this important area of study.
A number of caveats were noted for the research reported
herein, including especially the possibility of socially desirable
responses, and the fact that our sample was not representative.
These caveats notwithstanding, this study represents an expan-
sion on the research on courtroom stress and safety in particu-
lar in relation to judicial perspective. Through the incorpora-
tion of new dependant measures, including clinical instru-
ments, this study builds on previous research by allowing for a
more detailed examination of the nature of the stress experi-
enced by judges. Moreover, this study represents the first
research effort integrating both judicial stress and safety, allow-
ing for the examination of the relationship between two impor-
tant factors encountered by members of the judiciary. This
research also adds to previous studies of judicial stress by
examining individual differences, more specifically gender and
experience with a work-related stressful incident, and their
relation to both perceptions of stress and safety.
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2. It is worth noting that, empirically, it is not clear whether, under
what circumstances, or to what degree an apology might alter the
risk of an adverse liability determination.  Whether apologies
influence liability decision making in civil cases has not been
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text, confession evidence has been shown to exert a powerful
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When one person allegedly injures another, he or shewill often attempt to provide an account for theconduct that led to the injury.  Specifically, he or she
might attempt to disavow, explain, excuse, or justify the behav-
ior that purportedly led to the injury.  Alternately, he or she
might offer an apology to the injured person.  Apologies can be
distinguished from other forms of accounting in that they
acknowledge responsibility for the conduct that caused the
harm.  Accepting blame and expressing regret for one’s behav-
ior signals a recognition of the norm or rule that was violated
and of the harm caused to the other.1
Such acknowledgment can be complicated in the context of
litigation.  When the offense is such that it raises the possible
involvement of the legal system, defendants, defense counsel,
and insurance companies have traditionally worried that apol-
ogizing will only make things worse for the defendant; specifi-
cally, that any apology will be viewed as an admission and will
lead to more certain legal liability.2 Indeed, there is evidence
that although civil defendants, such as physicians in medical
malpractice cases, may sometimes desire to offer apologies, they
are also concerned that disclosure or acceptance of responsibil-
ity would increase the possibility for legal liability.3
As a general matter, of course, an apology by a party to liti-
gation is potentially admissible under the exception to the
hearsay rule that allows admission of a party’s own statements.
Other rules of evidence may prevent the admission of certain
apologetic statements in some circumstances – for example,
statements made in settlement discussions may be protected
under Rule 408.  However, apologies that are made outside of
these contexts are potentially admissible.  Consequently, many
defendants avoid apologizing and are so counseled by their
attorneys and insurers.
Despite the potential risks, however, there has been growing
interest in the possibility that clients might benefit, legally and
otherwise, from apologizing.4 Indeed, empirical studies exam-
ining the impact of apologies in a variety of contexts have
demonstrated a range of positive effects that flow from apolo-
gizing.  These effects include more favorable attributions, more
positive and less negative emotion for both apologizer and
recipient, improved physiological responses for both parties,
improved future relations, decreased need to punish, and more
likely forgiveness.  In addition to the potential physical, psy-
chological, and relational benefits of apologies, commentators
have argued that apologies have the potential to facilitate the
settlement of legal disputes—breaking impasse to allow pro-
ductive negotiation, allowing resolution to occur more quickly,
addressing parties’ non-legal concerns, or resulting in financial
settlement terms that are more favorable to the one who has
apologized.
Some proponents of encouraging apologies in litigation
have considered how defendants who desire to apologize
might do so “safely” given the patchwork of evidentiary pro-
tection traditionally available.  One recommendation has been
that defendants consider offering statements that express sym-
pathy for the other party, but that stop short of admitting
responsibility for having caused injury (i.e., “I’m sorry you
were hurt” rather than “I am sorry I hurt you.”).  These sym-
pathetic expressions are not complete apologies by most defi-
nitions—lacking, in particular, an acknowledgment of respon-
sibility for the behavior that led to the harm.  However, it is
argued that by offering  at least an expression of sympathy,
defendants can reap some of the benefits of apologizing while
simultaneously minimizing any increase in liability risk.
Concurrently, many states have recently enacted statutes
that are intended to encourage and protect certain apologetic
expressions by making them inadmissible in court.
Massachusetts enacted the first statute preventing the admis-
sion of some apologies in 1986.5 Since then, over two-thirds
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of the states have followed suit and have enacted statutes that
explicitly provide some apologies with evidentiary protection
(see Appendix).   Many of these statutes apply to civil litiga-
tion generally; others apply specifically to cases of medical
error.  In addition, these statutes vary as to the type of apolo-
getic statements that are protected.  For example, some
statutes only prevent the admission of those statements that
express sympathy (i.e., “I’m sorry that you were hurt.”), while
preserving the admissibility of any statement that acknowl-
edges fault (i.e., “It was my fault.”).  Other statutes have gone
further, also providing protection to statements that express
“fault,” “error,” or “mistake.”  Still other statutes protect
“apologies” without clearly defining the term.
Proponents of these protected apologies suggest that if the
law prevents the admission of apologetic expressions, defen-
dants will be more likely to offer them.  However, whether
these apology statutes will result in more apologies and what
form such apologies might take are open empirical questions.
Many argue that apologies are impeded by the fear of litigation
generally, and the fear that an apology will increase the risk of
liability more specifically.  However, other cultural and psy-
chological barriers to apologizing operate as well.  Apologies
are difficult to make—admitting that one’s behavior has caused
harm and apologizing for it is embarrassing and injurious to
one’s pride.  Nancy Berlinger recognizes the role that these
other obstacles to apologies may play when she notes that
“merely protecting apologies is not the same as encouraging
them.  Genuine apologies are never fun to make.”6
Critics of providing evidentiary protection for apologies rec-
ognize the possibility that allowing apologies to be introduced
against the apologizer in a subsequent legal proceeding could
have a “chilling effect” on such expressions of remorse, but
argue that removing the legal consequences of apologizing
would diminish the moral content of the apology.7 Others,
however, argue that even legally protected apologies are
socially useful, can promote settlement, and should be encour-
aged (or at least not discouraged).
Recent empirical work has begun to explore the role of
apologies in the civil justice system and to examine the
nuances of the ways in which apologies may influence the res-
olution of legal disputes.  This body of work suggests that
apologies have a role to play in fostering settlement, but that
the complexities of the apologies, the context in which they are
offered, and whether the apology is being evaluated by a
claimant, attorney, or judge, may moderate the ways in which
apologies influence settlement.
I.  CLAIMANTS AND APOLOGIES
As an initial matter, people anticipate that they would desire
an apology if they were injured by another.  A number of stud-
ies have found that medical patients report that they would
want to receive an apology from their physician if the physi-
cian made a mistake.8 In addition, studies that have asked liti-
gants about their motives for bringing suit find that many of
these plaintiffs believe that an apology from the other side is
one factor that might have changed the course of the litiga-
tion.9
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• Statements, writings, or benevolent gestures expressing
sympathy or a general sense of benevolence relating to
the pain, suffering or death of a person involved in an
accident and made to such person or to the family of
such person shall be inadmissible as evidence of an
admission of liability in a civil action.  MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. CH. 233, § 23D (West 1986).
• The portion of statements, writings, or benevolent ges-
tures expressing sympathy or a general sense of benevo-
lence relating to the pain, suffering, or death of a person
involved in an accident and made to that person or the
family of that person shall be inadmissible as evidence of
an admission of liability in a civil action.  A statement of
fault, however, which is part of, or in addition to, any of
the above shall not be inadmissible pursuant to this sec-
tion.  CAL. EVID. CODE § 1160(a) (2000).
• In any civil action brought by an alleged victim of an
unanticipated outcome of medical care, or in any arbi-
tration proceeding relating to such civil action, any and
all statements, affirmations, gestures, or conduct
expressing apology, fault, sympathy, commiseration, con-
dolence, compassion, or a general sense of benevolence
which are made by a health care provider or an employee
of a health care provider to the alleged victim, or a rep-
resentative of the alleged victim and which relate to the
discomfort, pain, suffering, injury, or death of the alleged
victim as the result of the unanticipated outcome of med-
ical care shall be inadmissible as evidence of an admis-
sion of liability or as evidence of an admission against
interest.  COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-135 (2003).
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adopted polices of disclosing
errors, apologizing for them,
and compensating for the
resulting injuries.  For exam-
ple, at the Veterans Affairs
Medical Center in Lexington,
Kentucky, patients are
informed that there has been
an adverse event whether or
not they are already aware
that there has been an inci-
dent.  If the hospital deter-
mines that there has been an
error, an apology is proffered
and an offer of settlement made.  Since implementing this pol-
icy, the hospital reports that patients are less angry following
adverse events and are more likely to maintain a good rela-
tionship with the hospital. The hospital also reports that cases
settle more quickly, self-reporting of errors by the medical pro-
fessionals has increased, the hospital has received positive pub-
licity, and litigation costs have declined.10 Other institutions
(e.g., University of Michigan Health System, John’s Hopkins,
Children’s Healthcare of Atlanta, Sturdy Memorial Hospital in
Boston) as well as private insurers (e.g., COPIC) have adopted
similar policies and report similarly positive results.11
In addition to this data from the field, experimental research
has provided insight into the processes by which apologies can
influence the ways in which injured parties construe an injury-
producing incident and, thus, their willingness to settle.
Specifically, these experiments find that apologies influence a
variety of litigation related judgments and decisions, including
the inclination to seek legal advice, the positions taken in set-
tlement negotiations, and the likelihood of accepting a partic-
ular settlement offer.
In one study, Kathleen Mazor and her colleagues explored
patients’ decisions about whether to obtain legal advice fol-
lowing a medical injury.12 Members of an insurance plan were
asked to take the perspective of a patient who had been injured
by a medical error.  Participants were either told that following
the error the physician provided little information and did not
take responsibility for the error (the “nondisclosure” condi-
tion) or were told that the physician provided information
about what had happened, apologized, and took responsibility
for the error, and detailed steps that would be taken to prevent
recurrence (the “full disclosure” condition).  Patients who
were told that the physician had provided full disclosure and
an apology following the error expressed greater satisfaction
and fewer negative emotions, reported more trust in the physi-
cian, were less likely to indicate that they would change doc-
tors, and were less likely to indicate that they would seek legal
advice in response to the incident than were patients whose
physician had not disclosed and apologized.
Professors Russell Korobkin and Chris Guthrie conducted
an experimental investigation of the effects of an apology on
litigants’ settlement decisions in a landlord-tenant dispute.13
Participants were asked to assume the role of the tenant in a
dispute between a landlord and tenant over a broken heater
and to evaluate a particular offer of settlement from the land-
lord.  Participants who were told that the landlord had apolo-
gized to them were marginally more likely to accept the land-
lord’s offer than were participants who had not received an
apology.
Similarly, I conducted a series of studies to examine how
laypeople in the role of an injured party respond to apologies
in making settlement decisions.14 Participants were asked to
respond to a scenario in which they were injured in a bicycle-
pedestrian collision. The other party offered either a partial
apology, which consisted of an expression of sympathy but no
acceptance of responsibility, a full, responsibility-accepting
apology, or no apology.  Apologies, particularly those that
accepted responsibility for having caused injury, favorably
influenced a variety of attributions made about the situation
and the other party, including perceptions of the character of
and the degree of regret experienced by the other party, expec-
tations about the way in which the other party would behave
in the future, and expectations about the relationship between
the parties going forward.  Similarly, apologies influenced the
emotions that participants reported they would feel—decreas-
ing anger toward the other party and increasing sympathy for
the other’s position.  Full, responsibility-accepting apologies
showed these effects consistently.  Apologies that merely
expressed sympathy were more context dependent, favorably
influencing these attributions under some circumstances, but
not in others.
These studies also found that apologies influence judg-
ments that are directly related to legal-settlement decision
making.  Many studies have demonstrated that the value that
a negotiator sets as his or her reservation price (or “bottom-
line”), the negotiator’s aspirations, and the negotiator’s judg-
ment about what a fair settlement would entail, all influence
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that patients 
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Apologies Create for Their Recipients, 13 CURRENT PSYCHOL. 10
(1994); Jane L. Risen & Thomas Gilovich, Target and Observer
Differences in the Acceptance of Questionable Apologies, 92  J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 418 (2007). 
22. See ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: SCIENCE AND PRACTICE 19
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23. Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settlemen, supra note 14;
Robbennolt, Apologies and Settlement Levers, supra note 14.  Note,
however, that an apology can be sincerely offered even though it
is subject to a rule protecting it.
final negotiated outcomes.  In my studies, there were circum-
stances under which claimants who received an apology had
lower aspirations and set lower values for their judgments
about what would be a fair settlement value.
Similarly, apologies influenced how individuals evaluated a
settlement offer in terms of its ability to make up for the harm
suffered, how they appraised their need to punish the other
party, and how they assessed their willingness to forgive the
other party.   Participants receiving apologies judged an offer as
being more adequate, felt less need to punish the other party,
and were more willing to forgive than were participants who
did not receive apologies.  Finally, full, responsibility-accepting
apologies increased the tendency of recipients to accept a par-
ticular settlement offer.  Interestingly, none of these judgments
or decisions were systematically influenced by variations in the
evidentiary rule governing apologies.
Thus, there is evidence that apologies are valued by
claimants and that apologies may help to facilitate settlement.
However, in addition to the hope that apologies may facilitate
settlement, much concern has been expressed about the possi-
bility that plaintiffs will be taken advantage of by insincere
apologies or that plaintiffs are not attentive enough to law (e.g.,
evidentiary rules) and will improvidently forfeit legal entitle-
ments.  In particular, there is concern that plaintiffs will be
“duped by communication strategies into relinquishing valu-
able legal rights, which can actually exacerbate the economic
dimension of suffering.”15 While strategic or insincere apolo-
gies may still serve some goals that plaintiffs have (e.g., serving
to acknowledge the wrong), such apologies may fail to serve
other plaintiff goals (e.g., achieving a change in behavior).
If litigants are able to detect and reject insincere apologies,
there might be less cause for concern.  This is because the per-
ceived sincerity of an apology can matter to its recipients.
People do not have the same favorable responses to explicitly
insincere apologies that they have to sincere apologies,16 and
insincere apologies may actually cause people to react nega-
tively.17 Thus, as Professor Dale Miller has argued, when
injured parties “perceive apologies to be insincere and
designed simply to ‘cool them out,’ they often react with more
rather than less indignation.”18
It is not clear, however, how well injured litigants are able
to detect and respond to
insincerity, particularly
when efforts are made to
appear sincere.19 On the
one hand, claimants are sen-
sitive to the differences in
content conveyed by apolo-
gies that accept responsibil-
ity for having caused harm
and statements that only
express sympathy for
injuries.20 Similarly, the effectiveness of apologies is influ-
enced by a variety of factors that might be seen as signals to the
sincerity of the apology.  Thus, apologies that include promises
to forbear from similar wrongful conduct in the future, apolo-
gies that are accompanied by offers of compensation, and
apologies that are properly timed all produce more favorable
reactions than apologies without these features.  These factors
may operate, at least in part, by altering the perceived sincerity
of the apology.
On the other hand, there is also evidence that people
respond favorably even to apologies that seem to be insincere
and that those who reject apologies, even unconvincing apolo-
gies, are judged less favorably than those who accept them.21
Thus, an apology “script” that contemplates that an apology
will be followed by acceptance of that apology may hold sway
over apology recipients’ behavior.  In addition, norms of reci-
procity may prescribe the acceptance of apologies.  The reci-
procity norm demands “that we should try to repay, in kind,
what another person has provided us.”22 Concessions offered
by one party to a negotiation trigger, under this norm, the
obligation to make a reciprocal concession.   If an apology
offered by a defendant is viewed as a “concession,” victims and
observers may respond favorably because they feel an obliga-
tion to respond with a reciprocal “concession” of their own.
Finally, as noted above, there is no evidence that laypeople
distinguish among apologies that are offered in the face of dif-
fering rules of evidence.23 Litigants may focus on personal fac-
tors (e.g., this person must be sorry) to the neglect of situa-
tional factors (e.g., this apology didn’t cost them anything)
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ior.  Accordingly, they may not
be sensitive to variations in the
evidentiary value of apologies
that result from these different
evidentiary rules.
II. ATTORNEYS AND 
APOLOGIES
In any case, there is growing
empirical evidence to support
the notion that claimants tend
to respond favorably to apolo-
gies offered in settlement nego-
tiation.  The litigants themselves, however, are not the only
legal actors involved in legal-settlement decision making.
Legal negotiation is often characterized by the involvement of
attorneys in the negotiation process.  While the client, not the
attorney, is supposed to make the ultimate decision about
whether to accept or reject a settlement offer, attorneys are
likely to have considerable influence on the client’s settlement
decisions.  Clients look to their attorneys for advice and rely
on them for knowledge of the substantive rules governing the
case, their understanding of the processes involved, and their
expertise as negotiators.
Given the presence of lawyers in much legal negotiation and
their influence on client decision making, it is important to
understand the effects that apologies might have on the settle-
ment recommendations that attorneys make to their clients.
Importantly, there are a number of reasons that attorneys
might be expected to have different responses to apologies
than do laypeople. 
First, attorneys may respond differently to apologies for rea-
sons attributable to their role as agent, rather than as a party to
the underlying dispute.  Attorneys as agents are likely to be
more detached from the interpersonal aspects of the dispute as
they have neither been injured nor alleged to have done the
injuring, and the relationships at issue are not their own.  This
detachment may enable the attorney to manage the conflict in
a way that avoids the barriers to settlement that may result
from an emotionally charged atmosphere, and may also lead
the attorney to respond differently than the client would have
to the psychological and emotional aspects of the dispute and
to place different emphasis on the importance of an apology.
Moreover, recent research that has shown that observers are
more likely to distinguish between sincere and insincere apolo-
gies than are the direct recipients of apologies.  In contrast to
direct recipients, observers do not feel obligated to credit insin-
cere apologies, and when observers do reject such apologies
they do not expect to be and are not judged more harshly.24
Thus, the social constraints that may limit recipients’
responses to apologies do not appear to operate the same way
when it comes to third-party observers.
A separate set of role effects may be related to the ways in
which attorneys are compensated.  Plaintiffs’ attorneys, who
are often compensated by a contingency fee, may not be
inclined to negotiate lower monetary settlements in light of
apologies, while defense attorneys, who are more likely to be
compensated by an hourly fee, may not be eager to speed set-
tlement of a case with an apology.  At the same time, however,
it is argued that contingency fee lawyers have incentives to set-
tle cases quickly, and apologies may be consistent with that
end.
Second, there is evidence that attorneys are selected and
trained to be more analytical and less emotional in their gen-
eral approach to settlement than are their clients.25 Of partic-
ular relevance to how attorneys and clients will respond to
apologies in litigation, there is evidence that lawyers may be
less influenced by concerns for equity or vindication and more
concerned with expected value analysis in responding to set-
tlement offers than are litigants.26
Third, attorneys may have a more heightened focus on pro-
tecting legal rights than do their clients.  Indeed, one study
found that the lawyers studied believed that one of the most
fundamental roles they served as legal professionals was their
service as “watchdogs” who are concerned with protecting
their clients’ legal entitlements.27 In particular, attorneys may
have a better sense of the evidentiary value of an apology and
may be more attuned to the ramifications of evidentiary rules
prohibiting or allowing apologies into evidence than are their
clients.  Thus, the evidential value of an apology and the rules
of evidence that determine an apology’s admissibility may have
a relatively greater impact on how apologies are viewed by
attorneys.
Using the pedestrian-bicycle accident scenario described
above, I examined the effects of apologies on attorney percep-
tions and judgments.28 The study asked attorneys to assume
that they represented the client described in the scenario.
Attorneys were then asked about their perceptions of the situ-
ation and to give their reservation prices, aspirations, and
assessments of the fair settlement value of the case.
Attorneys’ responses to apologies in the context of this case
paralleled the responses of laypeople in previous studies in a
number of ways.  First, attorneys assessed apologies and the
information communicated by the apologies in ways that were
similar to the assessments made by claimants—assessing full,
responsibility-accepting apologies more positively than they
did partial, sympathy-only apologies and assessing both of
these more positively than they did no apology. This suggests
that attorneys and laypeople made similar judgments about
the relative sufficiency of the different types of apologies and
24. Risen & Gilovich, supra note 21.
25. See Susan Daicoff, Lawyer, Know Thyself: A Review of Empirical
Research on Attorney Attributes Bearing on Professionalism, 46 AM. U.
L. REV. 1337 (1997); Chris Guthrie, The Lawyers’ Philosophical Map
and the Disputant’s Perceptual Map: Impediments to Facilitative
Mediation and Lawyering, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 145 (2001); Leonard
L. Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 29 (1982).
26. Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 13.
27. Craig A. McEwen et al., Lawyers, Mediation, and the Management
of Divorce Practice, 28 L. & SOC’Y REV. 149 (1994).
28. Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Attorneys, Apologies, and Settlement
Negotiation, 13 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 349 (2008).
Importantly, there








that the apologies conveyed similar information to both
groups about the degree to which the offender thought he or
she was responsible, the offender’s regret, the degree to which
the offender would be careful in the future, the degree to
which the offender’s conduct was offensive, the degree to
which the offender respected the client, and the offender’s
moral character.
In contrast, however, apologies had differing impacts on
attorney and claimant evaluations of the offender’s responsibil-
ity, the client’s anger, their own sympathy for the offender, the
client’s inclination to forgive the offender, and their own judg-
ment that the offender should be punished.  While claimants’
evaluations tended to be more favorable to the offender fol-
lowing an apology, attorneys’ evaluations were not influenced
by apologies.
In addition, apologies influenced attorneys’ settlement
levers in ways that diverge from the ways in which apologies
have been shown to influence claimants’ settlement levers.
Recall that apologies have been shown to decrease laypeople’s
aspirations and estimates of fair settlement value under some
circumstances.  In contrast, attorneys whose clients received a
full apology set somewhat higher aspirations and made some-
what higher estimates of a fair settlement value than did attor-
neys whose clients received no apology.  For plaintiff’s attor-
neys, this pattern only held when the applicable evidentiary
rule made such apologies admissible.  That is, settlement levers
were higher only when full apologies were offered and those
apologies were not made inadmissible by the rules of evidence.
This may suggest that attorneys are more attendant to the legal
effects of the evidentiary rules than are litigants.
These findings suggest that attorneys have instincts about
the functions of apologies that are different from the ways in
which their clients react to apologies.  Such a divergence is
consistent with concerns about a disconnect between the per-
ceptions and interests of attorneys and clients.  Many com-
mentators are concerned about the risk that attorneys’ focus on
the relevant legal rules will dominate the negotiation process
and the ultimate settlement of the dispute, to the exclusion of
the non-legal interests of the parties.  In particular, many have
argued that attorneys are inclined to dismiss apologies, despite
evidence that they are valued by clients.  This may lead attor-
neys on both sides to resist settlement or to push for trial
where their clients might otherwise prefer to settle.
Conversely, attorneys may not entirely understand their
clients’ or opposing clients’ resistance to settlement in the
absence of apologies.  This may lead attorneys on both sides to
dismiss claimant requests for apology and may result in a
reduced ability to “bring [the] client along” to accept a settle-
ment.29 In addition, defense attorneys may advise their clients
against apologizing because their perspective suggests that
apologies will lead to less favorable settlement terms in addi-
tion to any increased liability risk.   Any of these disconnects
may interfere with attorneys’ ability to settle cases to the best
satisfaction of their clients.
At the same time, however,
it is possible that that the dif-
ferences in the ways in which
apologies affect claimant and
attorney settlement levers
could serve to bring attorney
and client expectations closer
in line with each other.  Many
have argued that plaintiffs
sometimes bring with them
unrealistic expectations about
the value of a case and that
plaintiffs’ attorneys work to
manage such expectations and
to “sell” proposed settlements to clients.  If this is true, then a
decrease in plaintiffs’ aspirations and a corresponding increase
in their attorneys’ aspirations could serve to bring attorney and
client aspirations closer together, at least in some cases.
Whether their differing responses to apologies ultimately
push attorneys and clients closer together or pull them apart,
such divergences are likely to affect the discussion between
attorney and client about settlement.  Thus, attorneys must
give special consideration to how to appropriately advise
clients about settlement when an apology is at issue, balancing
respect for the interests that clients have that are addressed by
apologies while also providing a perspective that helps clients
to evaluate the credibility and legal consequences of an apol-
ogy offered in the context of litigation.
III.  JUDGES AND APOLOGIES
Judges, of course, also play a role in the settlement of cases.
Thus, understanding the ways in which judges respond to
apologies is also important.  Like the attorneys described
above, judges are trained as lawyers, are skilled analysts, and
are attentive to legal rights and responsibilities.  However,
unlike attorneys who represent one side or the other, judges
are neutral participants in the dispute.
Judge Andrew Wistrich and Professors Jeff Rachlinski and
Chris Guthrie recently conducted a series of studies to exam-
ine the effect of apologies on trial judges’ decision making.30
In two studies, they asked judges to consider the details of a
case and to give their assessment of the appropriate settlement
value of the case.  In both cases, the defendants admitted
responsibility for having caused the injuries to the plaintiff,
but disputed the amount of damages at issue.  Half of the
judges were told that the defendant had offered a full, respon-
sibility-accepting apology to the plaintiff during the settlement
conference.  In both studies, an apology by the defendant did
not influence the settlement values provided by the judges.  In
a third study, the researchers examined the effect of an apology
on judges’ inclination to discharge a debtor’s bankruptcy debt.
Again, there were no effects of apology on judges’ decisions.
29. See Gerald R. Williams, Negotiation as a Healing Process, 1996 J.
DISP. RESOL. 1, 24-25 & n.75 (finding that in 53% of cases that
went to trial, settlement failed due to lawyer inability to “bring
[the] client along”).
30. Andrew J. Wistrich, et al., Humans Judging Humans: Attribution
and Blame in Trial Judges (unpublished manuscript on file with
author).
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Thus, unlike other attor-
neys, judges did not appear to
inflate their assessment of the
appropriate settlement
amounts in the face of an
apology.  Conversely, unlike
claimants, judges did not
appear to moderate their
assessment of the appropriate
settlement amounts in
response to a defendant’s
apology.  One important
caveat to note in this regard is
that in each of these cases, all
judges were told that the
defendant had accepted
responsibility for having
caused the harm. To the extent that either attorneys’ expecta-
tion of a higher settlement amount or claimants’ expectation of
a lower settlement are driven by the acknowledgment of
responsibility attendant to a full apology, it remains unclear
what effect an apology might have on judges’ assessments in
cases in which liability was not already conceded.
Just as it is important for attorneys to understand how their
responses to apologies may differ from those of their clients, it
is also important for judges conducting settlement conferences
to understand how their responses to apologies may differ
from both those of the parties and their attorneys.  An aware-
ness of the ways in which apologies are valued by parties and
understood strategically by attorneys may enable judges to
assist the parties in crafting effective settlements.  For example,
a judge might simply raise the possibility of an apology with
the parties.  Or, a judge might structure a settlement confer-
ence to provide a context within which a discussion of apolo-
gies can occur, paying attention to the functions of apologies
for the various parties as well as to the legal implications of
apologies.
A judge who introduces the possibility of an apology into
the discussion ought to have an understanding of the relevant
jurisdiction’s apology provisions (see Appendix).  This knowl-
edge of the relevant law, combined with an understanding of
the potential value of apologies to claimants, the barriers to
apologizing for defendants, the potential for manipulation
posed by some apologies, and the differing perspectives of
claimants, defendants, and attorneys, can position the judge to
effectively guide the settlement discussions.
When considering whether to encourage an apology, atten-
tion ought to be paid to the context of the dispute.  For exam-
ple, while apologies may have beneficial effects regardless of
the state of the evidence, apologies may be both quite valuable
to claimants and less risky for defendants to offer when the evi-
dence pointing to liability is relatively clear.  Similarly, while
apologies are potentially useful in disputes between relative
strangers, apologies may be even more valuable and effective
when the dispute at hand involves a close or a potentially on-
going relationship—for example, a doctor-patient relationship,
a family relationship, or an employment relationship.  Initial
conversations might carefully explore the parties’ willingness
to offer or to receive apologies.  The judge can listen for signals
that one or both parties would be receptive to such an
exchange.  It may be wise to tentatively explore the possibility
of an apology with the defendant before raising the matter
directly with the plaintiff to avoid disappointment if it turns
out that the defendant is adamantly opposed to offering one.
Consideration might also be given to whether it might be
appropriate and productive for both parties to apologize to
each other.  
In addition, appreciation of what makes an apology effective
can be useful in guiding such discussions.  Apologies that
accept responsibility for having caused harm are more likely to
have positive effects and to have bigger impacts than are
expressions of sympathy.  Apologies may be more effective
when offered directly by a defendant to a plaintiff than when
mediated through their attorneys.  The timing of an apology is
also an important consideration.  However, the effects of tim-
ing on the effectiveness of apologies are complex.  On one
hand, an apology offered quickly after an injury has occurred
may prevent an injury from developing into a grievance or
conflict.  On the other hand, an apology may ring hollow if it
is offered too quickly and without reflection.  By the time of a
settlement conference, the possibility of an early apology may
have passed.  Nonetheless, it may be possible to jump start the
negotiations with an apology that is offered early in the dis-
cussions.  Importantly, however, experimental studies have
found that apologies can be most satisfactory when the recipi-
ent has had a chance to express his concerns and the apolo-
gizer has been able to articulate an understanding of the nature
of the offense and its consequences.31 Thus, the judge might
attempt to structure the discussion leading up to an apology
with this in mind.  Alternately, if it is not possible to secure an
apology before reaching a financial settlement, it might be
appropriate for a judge to introduce the possibility of arrang-
ing for an apology that would come after the financial terms of
the deal have been agreed to in principle.32
Judges might also consider mediation as a process within
which apologies can be usefully addressed.  Because many
states provide that statements made in mediation are not
admissible in subsequent legal proceedings, defendants and
defense attorneys may be more comfortable offering apologies
in mediation.  Moreover, the mediation process was designed,
in part, to allow parties to play a central role in the negotiation
process and to determine for themselves the norms that would
govern the resolution of their dispute.  
In mediation, the parties themselves can participate directly
in the settlement negotiation discussions, assisted by the medi-
ator and while still being advised by their attorneys.  A skilled
mediator may be able to help create the opportunity for a dis-
cussion among the disputants that involves acknowledgment
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those of the 
parties and their
attorneys.
and apology, to facilitate that discussion, and to facilitate the
negotiation that may need to occur between attorney and
client.   The process allows disputants to introduce non-mon-
etary factors—such as apology—into the discussion.  And, the
attorneys are still available to advise clients as to the legal con-
sequences of apologies or particular settlement proposals.
Mediation, then, can provide either party with an occasion to
communicate to the other side their desire to give or to receive
an apology and can be a process that is designed to facilitate
such conversations.
CONCLUSION
Apologies may have a role to play in the settlement of legal
disputes.  Claimants, attorneys, and judges, however, respond
to apologies made in the context of litigation in different ways.
Judges who understand the nuanced effects that apologies
have on the decision making of parties and their attorneys, and
who are aware that their own responses may differ from both,
will be in a better position to effectively assist in the resolution
of legal disputes.
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RECENT BOOKS
Brian J. Ostrom, Charles W. Ostrom, Jr.,
Roger A. Hanson & Matthew Kleiman,
TRIAL COURTS AS ORGANIZATIONS, Temple
University Press, 2007.  190 pp.  $56.50.
Courts face many challenges, and one
of the criticisms that has been made
against courts is that they are not well
managed. Many of us have heard the
common refrain that leading judges is
like herding cats, an image that certainly
would not be the model for management
in the business world.
A group of researchers at the National
Center for State Courts and in academia
have made a significant contribution to
the understanding of how trial courts
are—and can be—managed in this book.
They begin the book by noting the
importance of this subject: “Courts are
independent bodies only if they adminis-
ter justice effectively. They administer
justice effectively only if they have a
sound management culture. Therefore,
courts will be independent and effective
only if they operate with a sound man-
agement culture.”
But getting a sound management cul-
ture in a trial court is easier said than
done.  Local legal cultures and those of
their courts vary greatly.  In the absence
of some way to describe and measure
those cultures—and then to compare
how court cultures may affect court per-
formance—it would be impossible to
make comprehensive suggestions for
improvements in court management.
These researchers developed a Court
Culture Assessment Instrument, based
on a similar instrument used in business.
They administered that instrument to
judges handling criminal cases in 12 dif-
ferent courts in 4 states, and they simul-
taneously evaluated court performance
through standardized data showing time
to case disposition as well as through sur-
veys of prosecutors and defense attorneys
on issues like access to justice, fairness,
and managerial effectiveness.
The authors ultimately describe four
different court cultures that are charac-
terized by high or low levels of two vari-
ables:  solidarity and sociability.
Solidarity reflects the extent to which a
court has clearly understood and shared
goals, while sociability refers to the
degree to which people work together in
a cooperative and cordial way.  The book
provides a great deal of detail about these
cultures, but here’s a quick overview:
• Networked:  high solidarity, high socia-
bility.  This culture values consensus
but strives toward innovation, vision-
ary thinking, and personal develop-
ment.
• Communal: low solidarity, high socia-
bility.  This culture provides flexibility
and values egalitarianism, negotiation,
trust, and collegiality.
• Autonomous: low solidarity, low socia-
bility.  This culture is self-managing
and values personal loyalty, indepen-
dence, and autonomy.
• Heirarchical: high solidarity, low socia-
bility.  This culture has an explicit
chain of command and is rule-ori-
ented, with a high value placed on
merit, modern administration, and
standardized procedures.
While many courts had divergent cultures
within them, a dominant culture could
generally be found, and all courts domi-
nated by each of the four cultures were
found within a single state, Minnesota.   
So does court culture affect court per-
formance?  Yes.  The courts that empha-
sized solidarity (networked and hierar-
chical court cultures) processed their
criminal cases faster—more closely
reaching ABA time standards—than
courts that did not emphasize solidarity.
Does that mean that all courts should
move toward a hierarchical or networked
approach?  Maybe not.  Surveys of prose-
cutors and defense attorneys showed that
the attorneys working in these courts
rated hierarchical and networked courts
lower in areas like promoting access, fair-
ness, and managerial effectiveness.  The
attorneys preferred autonomous court
cultures and seemed to view timeliness as
strictly for the court’s benefit, not that of
the attorneys or the parties.  
The authors conclude with a para-
phrase of a famous line from literature.
Anna Karenina begins, “Happy families
are all alike; every unhappy family is
unhappy in its own way.”  The authors’
version for the courts:  “Happy Courts are
all alike; every unhappy court is unhappy
in its own way.”  As in many other areas,
they conclude that there is no single key
to success for a court but that any num-
ber of factors may cause failure:  “To be
successful across all . . . trial court work
areas, courts must pay attention simulta-
neously to multiple, and often compet-
ing, values. . . .  [T]here are many ways in
which court leaders can fail.”
We’ve only scratched the surface of the
interesting data and insights presented in
the book.  Political science professor
Susette Talarico called the authors’ work
“the most innovative study of trial courts
in the past 10 or 15 years.”  We think you
will find it quite interesting too.  The
authors have reviewed research on orga-
nization and management in the private
sector, and they have adroitly adapted it
to trial courts.  They conclude that there
is no single “right” answer to court cul-
ture—none of the cultures is by defini-
tion good or bad, but there are conse-
quences to performance.  If you’re inter-
ested in the differences in cultures
between courts and how these differences
may affect performance, you should take
a look at this book.
UPCOMING CONFERENCE
American Judges Association 
Annual Educational Conference
http://aja.ncsc.dni.us/conferences/
The American Judges Association will
hold its 51st annual educational confer-
ence October 3-8, 2010 at the Westin
Tabor Center in Denver, Colorado.  The
conference should be our best ever—held
in collaboration with the Colorado state
courts and many other entities.  For an
overview of the conference program, take
a look at the inside back cover.  Then go
to the AJA’s website for more information
on the conference and full registration
details.  We hope to see you in Denver!
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